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ABSTRACT 
 
 Energy and environmental economics are closely related fields as nearly all forms of 
energy production generate pollution and thus nearly all forms of environmental policy affect 
energy production and consumption.  The three essays in this dissertation are related by their 
common themes of energy and environmental economics, but they differ in their methodologies.  
The first chapter is an empirical exercise that looks that the relationship between electricity price 
deregulation and maintenance outages at nuclear power plants.  The second chapter is an applied 
theory paper that investigates environmental regulation in a multiple pollutants setting.  The third 
chapter develops a new methodology regarding the construction of analytical general equilibrium 
models that can be used to study topics in energy and environmental economics. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Evidence on Electricity Market Reforms: 
Divestiture, Price Regulation, and the Use of Nuclear Power 
 
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, many U.S. states engaged in dramatic electricity market 
reform in an effort to reduce costs and lower electricity prices [Joskow (1997)].  For the 
wholesale electricity markets, two important and related issues are generating unit divestiture 
and price deregulation.  Divestiture occurs when a vertically integrated, investor-owned utility 
either transfers an electric generating unit to an unregulated subsidiary or sells it to an 
independent power producer.  Traditionally, the vertically integrated monopolies received a fixed 
price – usually average cost plus a normal rate of return – for their electricity as determined by a 
public utility commission (PUC).  However, once divested the price at which the unit can sell its 
electricity becomes another dimension of deregulation.   
This chapter uses data on the fleet of U.S. nuclear generating units (NGUs) to investigate 
the effects of divestiture and price deregulation on unit efficiency across two different 
dimensions: (1) level of output, and (2) timing of generation.  Davis and Wolfram (2012) show 
that divestiture leads to output-level gains from divestiture due to horizontal consolidation.  I 
build on Davis and Wolfram (2012) by adding a price deregulation measure in addition to their 
unit divestiture measure, when looking for output-level gains at US NGUs using monthly data.  
Specifically, I define price deregulated NGUs as those units that have exempt wholesale 
generator status (see discussion below).  I find no difference in output-level if a NGU is also 
price deregulated.
1
   
Next, to look at the timing of generation, I construct and use a unique dataset to measure 
the effect of price deregulation on maintenance outages at U.S. NGUs using daily data.  As I 
show below, theory suggests that price deregulation leads NGUs to defer maintenance to lower-
demand periods in order to maximize short-run profits, a behavior that is socially efficient and 
that I call the “maintenance-allocation efficiency gains” from price deregulation.  The estimation 
result is used to calculate the size of the maintenance-allocation efficiency gain.  The main data 
                                                             
1 Theory suggests that price deregulation might even lower aggregate output as profit-maximizing firms try to time 
generation to coincide with high prices.  However, regulatory oversight pushes against this tendency and towards 
output maximization as NGUs have low marginal costs.  In contrast, divestiture only is associated with output-level 
increases at NGUs due to lower operating costs following horizontal consolidation [Davis and Wolfram (2012)].  
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are from the Power Reactor Status Reports (PRSRs) collected by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC).  The PRSRs record a daily snapshot of a NGU’s operation, including the 
reactor power level (0-100%).  Importantly, the PRSRs allow me to distinguish among three 
reasons for a NGU not to be operating at full power: refueling period, unplanned maintenance, 
and planned maintenance. 
During Summer months from 1999 to 2008, I find that a one degree increase in the 
maximum daily temperature over 95 degrees (F) in the Summer (June, July, and August) yields a 
0.11 percentage point decrease in the daily probability of a NGU operating at less than 100% 
capacity due to planned maintenance, if the unit can sell electricity as an exempt wholesale 
generator.  The maximum daily temperature at each NGU is used as a proxy for demand.  The 
dollar value of the maintenance-allocation efficiency gain is $17.7 million annually (in 2010 
dollars) at exempt wholesale generators.
2
 
This chapter contributes to two related lines of the literature.  First, it adds to the existing 
literature on the effect of electric market reforms.  Prior to deregulation, many papers examined 
the potential welfare gains from competitive electricity.  For instance, Kliet and Terrell (2001) 
predicted the average U.S. EGUs would reduce operating costs 13% given market deregulation.  
Post deregulation, Douglas (2006) finds that wholesale markets reduced operating costs by 2 to 3 
percent for coal-fired power plants in the Eastern United States.  Similarly, Fabrizio et al (2007) 
finds medium-term efficiency gains attributable to deregulation across the entire fleet of 
operational EGUs.  
Second, this chapter adds to the literature that focuses on the performance of nuclear 
power plants.  Joskow and Rozanski (1979) investigates “learning-by-doing” and finds that 
learning-by-doing at the existing reactor fleet increases the ultimate capacity factor at future 
plants by 5 percent per year.   Rothwell (1990) decomposes NGU capacity factors into utilization 
rates and service factors, and identifies the relationship between productivity and observed NGU 
characteristics.  In another learning-by-doing paper, Lester and McCabe (1993) compare 
learning-by-doing at U.S. reactors compared to reactor in France.  Rust and Rothwell (1997) 
estimate a dynamic optimization model of NGU maintenance with the Three Mile Incident of 
March 1979 as a break regulatory oversight at U.S. NGUs.  At the nexus of these two strands of 
                                                             
2 Since exempt wholesale generators comprise about one-fourth of the U.S. NGU fleet, then if the maintenance-
allocation efficiency gains did accrue to all NGUs the saving would be about $50.0 million annually. 
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the literature, Davis and Wolfram (2012) [hereafter DW (2012)] find output increases at divested 
nuclear units.  Hausman (2013) looks that the relationship between divestiture and safety at 
NGUs and finds that divestiture does not lead to an increase in observable risk factors.  
This chapter adds to that literature by (1) extending the results from DW (2012) by 
adding an additional price deregulation variable to the analysis; and, (2) identifying and 
measuring maintenance-allocation efficiency gains from deregulated pricing.  Both steps are 
necessary since divestiture is a necessary condition for price deregulation under current 
regulatory policy.  The chapter proceeds as follows.  Section 1 provides background information 
about the U.S. electric power sector.  It describes important characteristics of electricity supply 
and demand, briefly reviews the history of deregulation, discusses the role of nuclear generating 
units in the electricity sector, and defines divestiture and price deregulation.  Section 2 replicates 
the setup of DW (2012) using monthly generation data, while adding my additional price 
deregulation variable to look for additional changes in the level of output.  Section 3 starts with a 
formal model that demonstrates maintenance-allocation efficiency gains from marginal pricing, 
and ends with the empirical specification.  Section 4 describes the new dataset, reports baseline 
estimation results, interprets the results, and performs robustness checks.  Section 5 looks at 
differences in NGUs costs by regulatory status to investigate the hypothesis that divested 
reactors have higher fixed costs than non-divested reactors due to the stranded-cost problem, and 
I find evidence that divested reactors in fact have higher fixed costs.  Section 6 has concluding 
remarks and discussion. 
 
1 Background and Definitions 
1.A General Information 
The U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA) reports that the United States power sector had 
14,959 electricity generating units (EGUs) in 2009 with a total nameplate capacity over 1.046 
million megawatts (MW) that produced 3,813.3 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) of electricity per 
year.  Thus, the U.S. electric power sector had an aggregate annual capacity factor of 42% in 
2009 (where capacity factor is defined as net generation divided by capacity times hours per 
year).  That is, the average hour in 2009 saw less than half of the total available capacity being 
used to generate electricity.  The main reasons are the inability to store electricity economically 
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and the large variation in electricity demand across seasons.  Relatedly, the electricity power 
sector deploys a variety of EGU types with different cost and performance characteristics.  At 
one extreme are EGUs with high fixed costs and relatively low variable costs known as 
“baseload” units.  These units run at high annual capacity factors in order to spread their fixed 
costs over many hours of generation.  The baseload capacity in many regions of the U.S. is 
comprised of nuclear-powered, coal-fired, and hydro-electric units.  In some regions, natural gas-
fired units called combined-cycle units also add to baseload generation.  At the other extreme are 
EGUs with low fixed-cost and relatively high variable-cost, known as “peaker” units that only 
operate in high-demand periods and have very low annual capacity factors.  Generally, the 
peaker units operate only on high demand days. 
 Nuclear generating units are an important part of baseload capacity in the United States, 
with 104 NGUs located at 66 plants in 31 states (where more than one reactor can be sited at 
single power plant).  The approximately 100,000 MW of nuclear capacity constitutes only 10% 
of total U.S. power sector capacity, but NGUs produced nearly 20% of total electricity in 2009, 
achieving an annual average capacity factor of 90.4%, a rate much higher than the average EGU.  
Thus, NGUs provide a disproportionate share of total generation compared to their capacity.  In 
addition, an average NGU has a much higher capacity than an average EGU: the average nuclear 
generating unit is 1000 MW, the average coal-fired unit is 250 MW, the average gas-fired 
combined-cycle unit is 125 MW, and the average turbine unit (i.e. “peaker”) is 25 MW.  Thus, if 
an NGU does not operate on a high-demand day, then nearly 40 “peaker” units must come online 
to satisfy demand.  These peaker units often have few controls to limit air pollutants such as NOX 
that is particularly harmful during high-temperature days as it contributes to ground-level ozone 
formation.
3
 
                                                             
3 Auffhammer and Kellogg (2011) provides an excellent discussion of ground-level ozone formation in the context 
of gasoline reformulation regulations.  Auffhammer and Kellogg (2011) notes ozone formation requires high 
temperatures and sunlight in the presence of both volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and nitrous oxides (NOX).  
Electric generators can be a large source of NOX and these emissions can impact ozone levels up to 1000 km 
downwind, since such areas may no longer be “NOX-limited”.  
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1.B Deregulation 
1.B.1 Historical Regulation 
Traditionally, the U.S. electric power sector consisted of vertically integrated, investor-owned 
utilities that were granted monopoly status for their service area by regulators [Joskow (1997)].  
These regulated monopolies operated the generating units, owned the transmission lines, and 
serviced customers.  In each state, a public utility commission (PUC) regulated prices.  In 
general, the prices were set to cover the long-run average cost of the natural monopoly plus 
economic profit, although some PUCs provided incentives for utilities to increase efficiency [e.g. 
Knittel (2002)].  Until the mid-1990s, vertically integrated monopolies sold over 90 percent of 
electricity in the United States [Fabrizio et al (2007)]. 
  
1.B.2 Divestiture 
During the late-1990s and early-2000s, the U.S. electric power underwent significant 
restructuring and deregulation, and this process varied by state.  Since the regulation (and 
deregulation) of electricity utilities occurs at the state level, the United States does not have a 
uniform regulation of the electric power sector and the analysis exploits this variation.
4
  With 
deregulation many utilities were required to divest their power plants, meaning that the plant is 
either transferred to unregulated subsidiary or sold to an independent power producer (IPP) 
[Hausman (2013)].  DW (2012) record that from 1999-2008, 48 of the 103 operating NGUs were 
divested.   
 
1.B.3 Price Deregulation 
Using Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) filings, I record that from 1999 to 2008, 
19 of the 48 divested NGUs also gained exempt wholesale generator (EWG) status.
5
  The Energy 
                                                             
4
 California’s electricity crisis in 2000-2001 led to roll-back of deregulation in many states and a halt to planned 
deregulation in other states [see Borenstein et. al. (2002), Wolak (2003)].  No new effort to restart the deregulation 
process has occurred. 
   
5 Specifically, I look at the 2009 EIA Form-860 for all NGUs and collect the FERC docket number associated with 
gaining EWG status.  Then, I pull the FERC dockets and record the date FERC granted EWG status to the NGUs, 
and use that date as the change in status from divested only to price deregulated. 
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Policy Act of 1992 created this new category of independent power producers that are allowed to 
own EGUs and sell their electricity in unregulated wholesale markets to electric utilities and 
municipalities [Joskow (1996), Johnson et al (1998), Besanko et al (2001)].  This means not all 
divested NGUs are EWGs.  Thus,   NGUs without EWG status are still subject to the restrictions 
of the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUCHA), while EWGs are no longer considered a 
utility and thus largely exempt from the requirement of the law.
6
  The Energy Policy Act of 1992 
also requires electric utilities to open their transmission grid to EWGs, and this requirement took 
effect in early April 1996 [Johnson et al (1998), Besanko et al (2001)].  That is, FERC ordered 
the vertically integrated utilities to serve as common carriers for the electricity generated by the 
EWG [White (1996)].   Therefore, I interpret NGUs with EWG status as fully price deregulated.  
Conversely, NGUs that are only divested by not exempt wholesale generators are price 
constrained as the regulator still has oversight over the transactions between the retail utility and 
“affiliated interests” such as a subsidiary [RAP (2011)]. 
 Figure 1 shows the number of divested (DIV) and price deregulated (EWG) reactors from 
1998 to 2009.  From 1999 to 2001, over 30 reactors were divested and over 10 of those reactors 
also gained exempt wholesale generator status (where the total number of divested reactors is the 
sum of the grey and black bars).   By 2007, nearly 50 reactors were divested and almost half 
were also EWGs.  No NGUs were built or retired from 1998 to 2009, so the size of the reactor 
fleet remained constant for the years covered by Figure 1.  Furthermore, when a reactor becomes 
either divested or price deregulated, it never reverts to being more regulated during this period.    
 
2 Monthly Setup 
The goal of this section is two-fold.  First, I replicate the result from DW (2012) that divested 
nuclear generating units exhibit output-level gains compared to non-divested reactors, and I 
verify the results of DW (2012).  Second, I expand on the DW (2012) result by checking for 
additional output-level gains from nuclear generating units that are also price deregulated as 
measured by exempt wholesale generator status.  I find no statistical difference in output-level at 
divested units that are also price deregulated.  However, the negative point estimates suggests 
                                                             
6 The Energy Policy Act of 1992 essentially expanded the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978 
to include non-Qualifying Facilities (QFs).  Under PURPA, QFs were limited to small power production facilities 
under 30 MW (with exemptions for some renewable-energy projects). 
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price deregulated reactors may have lower total output in order to better align output with high-
demand days.     
 
2.A Monthly Setup: Data 
The empirical strategy below basically compares groups of NGUs depending on regulator status 
for the two dimensions of regulatory change: divestiture and price deregulation.    
To start, the non-divested reactors are used as the counterfactual control group for the 
divested reactors.  The validity of the counterfactual depends on whether reactors under different 
regulatory regimes are ex ante similar for both observable and unobservable characteristics.  
Table 1 compares divested reactors with all non-divested reactors, where column [1] reports 
summary statistics for the divested reactors, column [2] shows non-divested reactors, and column 
[3] shows p-values from a test that the means are equal in the two subsamples.
7
  Note that Table 
1 replicates a similar table in DW (2012). 
As Table 1 shows, divested and non-divested reactors are similar across many observable 
characteristics, such as reactor size, age, and manufacturer.  However, these groups differ by 
location and by the type of reactor (pressurized- vs. boiling- water reactor).  In particular, none 
of the non-divested reactors are in the Northeast census region of the United States, while half of 
the divested reactors are located in the Northeast region and these geographic differences mimic 
the pattern of state-level deregulation efforts.  Thus, the empirical strategy here looks at within-
reactor output changes over time related to regulatory status change.  
Similarly, Table 2 compares observable characteristics of price-deregulated reactors with 
only divested reactors (recalling reactor divestiture is a necessary condition for EWG status).  
That is, Table 2 takes the divested reactors from Table 1 column [1] and splits that subgroup into 
two subgroups.  Table 2 demonstrates that price-deregulated reactors are similar to divested-only 
reactors with the exception of geographic distribution, as most of the price-deregulated reactors 
are located in the Northeastern United States. 
 
                                                             
7 Following DW (20120 and Hausman (2013), this study omits one of the currently operating reactors, Browns Ferry 
1, which was offline from 1985 to 2007 due to a long-running retrofit project.  Thus, the total number of cross-
sectional reactors sums to 103 instead of 104. 
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2.B Monthly Setup: Estimation Results 
The main empirical approach used by DW (2012), and in this section, has a dependent variable 
defined as net generation as a percent of design capacity.  That is, suppose i indexes the reactor 
(NGU) and t indexes the month.  Then, on a reactor-month basis, divide the net generation at 
each reactor by the reactor’s design capacity times the number of hours in month to get the 
dependent variable   itY   defined as:
8
 
 
 
 tMonthHours_Per_)MWE(CapacityDesign
GenerationNet


i
it
itY ,  
 
so the main regression equation in DW (2012) is then given: 
 
ittiititit XY   110 ]DIV[1  (1) 
 
where the covariate of interest is 1[DIV]it, an indicator variable taking the value one if  reactor i 
is classified as nonutility generator in month t.  Recall no divested reactor is ever observed to 
switch back to being a utility generator.  Thus, the parameter  1   measures the effect of 
divestiture on output-level in percentage points (as measured by net generation as a percent of 
design capacity).  The full set of covariates in equation (1) controls for a cubic in reactor age  
 itX , reactor fixed effects  i , year and month of sample fixed effects   t , and the error term 
 it .   
 Next, I extend the DW (2012) approach by adding the additional covariate 1[EWG]it, an 
indicator variable taking the value one if reactor i is price deregulated in month t.  The extended 
estimation equation is given: 
     
ittiitititit XY   1210 ]EWG[1]DIV[1  (2) 
                                                             
8 This metric is closely related to the often-used capacity factor (CF) metric, which uses current capacity instead of 
design capacity in the denominator; specifically CFit=[Net Generation]it/([Capacity]it × [Hours_Per_Month]t) where 
the time subscript here appears twice in the denominator.  The choice of design capacity in this study is to remove 
the potentially endogenous uprating process that allows some reactors to increase capacity beyond original design 
specifications. 
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where  
2   measures the additional effect of price deregulation on output-level in percentage 
points (recalling that divestiture is a necessary condition for exempt wholesale generator status).  
That is, 1[EWG] can be interpreted as an interaction term between 1[DIV] and price 
deregulation. I then apply equations (1) and (2) to the reactor-month data from 1970-2009, 
including over 36,000 observations.
9
 
 Table 3 Panel A reports the coefficient estimate for  1   when using (1) as the basic 
estimating equation.  Then Panel B reports coefficient estimates for  1   and  2   when using (2) 
as the basic estimating equation.  The columns of Table 3 record estimates using different sets of 
controls.  Columns [1] and [2] each provide estimates based on limited versions of the estimation 
equations, where column [1] only controls for the year and month of sample fixed effects, while 
column [2] adds reactor fixed effects.  Then, column [3] adds the cubic of reactor age to arrive at 
the full set of controls in equations (1) and (2).  Furthermore, column [4] weights by reactor 
capacity, and column [5] collapses the dataset to the plant-level observations.  The results in 
Table 3 Panel A closely match those in DW (2012); for instance, the model specification found 
in column [4] implies that divestiture is associated with 9.4 percent point increase in operating 
performance as measured by output-level differences.
10,11
  The results in Panel B show that 
adding the price-deregulation variable does not significantly change the coefficient estimate on 
the divestiture variable and the price-deregulation coefficient is not statistically significant, 
although the point estimates are negative.  In addition, note that the R
2
 values are similar in 
Panels A and B for each column.   Overall, I interpret these finding to mean that output-level 
gains only come through divestiture and not via price deregulation.
12
 
                                                             
9 From 1970 to 1985 and 2001 to 2002, U.S. EIA only reported plant-level net generation data.  In such cases, net 
generation is allocated to the unit-level by current capacity (not design capacity) after accounting for uprating over 
time.  When omitting the years 1970 to 1985 and only using data from 1986 to 2009, the estimation results presented 
in Table 3 are essentially unchanged.  However, I following DW (2012) in using data from 1970-2009. 
 
10 Rothwell (1996) examines the proposition that horizontal consolidation increase productivity under intermediate 
levels of uncertainty, and finds evidence of increased output due to longer periods of operation. 
 
11 The datasets were constructed independently, with potentially minor differences leading to non-identical 
coefficient estimates here as compared to DW (2012).  However, the differences in coefficient estimates across the 
two analyses are not statistically significant.   
 
12 I also apply the simple formula in Thompson (2011) to confirm the statistical significance of these results when 
clustering both by plant and time (i.e. double clustering).  The regressions summarized in Table 3 cluster the 
10 
 
 As in DW (2012), I check for heterogeneous effects across observable characteristics and 
find no statistical differences in the coefficient estimates for equations (1) and (2) for the 
following criteria:  reactor type, reactor manufacture, states with high versus low average 
wholesale prices, and reactor online year vintage (before 1975, 1975 to 1985, and 1985 to 
present).  For example, Table 4 shows the results from categorizing reactors by those in states 
with high and low average wholesale prices (using the same price categorization methodology as 
DW (2012)).  Table 4 column [1] shows the results for equation (1), where 26 reactors are in 
states with high prices, and 22 reactors are in states with low prices (with the remain reactors 
being in states without wholesale price data).  Table 4 has two different  1   estimates:  
H
1   for 
high-price states, and  
L
1   for low-price states.  The cutoff between high and low average prices 
is $60/MWh.  I find that  
H
1   and  
L
1   are not statistically different from each other.  Table 4 
column [2] reports the results for equation (2), where most of the price deregulated reactors are 
in high average wholesale price states (n=17).  Here, as in Table 3, additionally controlling for 
price deregulation does not significantly affect the divestiture coefficient estimates, where the 
price-deregulation variable is similarly split into  
H
2   and  
L
2 .  Both price-deregulation 
coefficient estimates are statically insignificant.  However, the signs on estimates for  
H
2   and  
L
2   suggest that high prices provide an incentive for reactors to increase output.        
Recall that Tables 1 and 2 show that reactors differ geographic by regulatory status; for 
example, the Northeast U.S. has the majority of divested reactors.  Table 5 checks for selection 
bias by census region, as each of the four census regions are dropped successively from the 
estimation of equations (1) and (2).  For instance, the regression that leads to the estimates in 
Table 5 column [1] excludes the 8 reactors in the West census region.  Table 5 column [2] that 
excludes reactors in the Northeast census region is the only estimation that finds a statistically 
significant result on the price deregulation variable.  However, only 4 price deregulated reactors 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
standard errors by plant, and the preferred specification includes both reactor fixed effects and year-month fixed 
effects.  The year-month fixed effects act as non-parametric time trend that is common to all reactors.  However, as 
Thompson (2011) observes time dummies do not handle all forms of time correlated errors, and this occurs when the 
vector of random time effects have different loading factors across units.  I apply Thompson (2011)’s double 
clustering formula assuming no persistent common shocks, and find that the statistical significant of the results in 
Table 3 unchanged.  Specifically, clustering by time yields the nearly same variance matrix as the 
heteroskedasticity-robust OLS variance matrix, and those terms cancel out of the double-clustering formula.  In 
general, clustering by plant yields standard errors that are twice as large compared to clustering by time.    
11 
 
are outside the Northeast region, so the overall relevance of this finding is limited.  Overall, 
divestiture effects do not differ greatly by region, although some variation does exist, while 
price-deregulation effects seem isolated to the Northeast region. 
Finally, again following DW (2012) for equation (1), I estimate equation (2) by month 
and thus generate 12 coefficient estimates per regulatory variable.  Figure 2 plots the coefficient 
estimates along with 95% confidence interval bars, where the black line plots  
1 ,  and the grey 
line plots  2 .  Overall, the pattern remains that the coefficient on the divestiture variable is 
positive and significant, while the coefficient on the price-deregulation variable is insignificant.  
However, note that during the summer and specifically July, the coefficient estimates appear to 
converge.  I interpret this result as preliminary evidence that price-deregulated reactors respond 
to high prices in the Summer with additional output (as the next section explores in greater 
detail). 
 
3 Daily Setup: Theory and Specification 
The first sub-section develops a formal model to show the maintenance-allocation efficiency 
gains from deregulated pricing compared to regulated pricing.  The second sub-section describes 
the empirical strategy and its motivation.   
 
3.A Daily Setup: Model Hypotheses 
This section builds a formal model to show the maintenance-allocation efficiency gains from 
deregulated pricing compared to regulated pricing.  For the simplicity, assume deregulated 
pricing means marginal pricing; that is, the electricity producer earns the market clearing price 
for each unit of electricity sold.
13
  Meanwhile, assume regulated pricing means that the electricity 
producer is compensated its average cost of production plus normal rate of return for each unit 
sold.  The model assumes certainty and only examines the short run, with the number and 
characteristics of electric generating units fixed.  In addition, the model addresses neither bidding 
                                                             
13 Although NGUs sell much of their power through bilateral contracts at a fixed price, the remainder is sold via the 
wholesale market at the marginal price.  Thus, in the short-run, price-deregulated NGUs maximize profit by looking 
at the marginal price.  
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behavior in a game theoretical structure nor issues of market power.
14
  Yet this simple model is 
enough to demonstrate that deregulated pricing creates an incentive to maximize NGU output 
during high-demand periods by deferring output-reducing maintenance to low-demand periods.  
Specifically, the opportunity cost of not generating in a high-demand period is larger for a NGU 
under deregulated pricing than under regulated pricing.  Furthermore, under regulated pricing, a 
NGU is indifferent between performing output-reducing maintenance in high-demand periods or 
in low-demand periods.  Finally, the model shows that deregulated pricing aligns the incentives 
of the NGU operator with society welfare, since deregulated pricing decreases the total cost of 
generation for a given total quantity demand.  
Distinguish three types of EGUs by their marginal cost of generation: very-low (V), low 
(L), and high (H).  The costs are given Vc , Lc , and Hc , where  HLV ccc  .  Each type has a 
fixed capacity given by  Vq ,  Lq , and  Hq , respectively.  The very-low type represents NGUs.  
Let  )(QS   be the market supply curve created by ordering EGUs from lowest to highest 
marginal cost (where Q is the total quantity of electricity supplied).   Let  HD   and  LD   be high 
and low levels of total demand for electricity, respectively, so  HL DD  .  Assume the short-run 
demand is perfectly inelastic with respect to price.  Also, assume demand in the low-demand 
case requires all the very-low cost EGUs and some of the low cost EGUs, but that demand in the 
high-demand case requires all of the very-low and low cost plus some of the high cost EGUs.
15
  
Given that deregulated pricing means marginal pricing,  )(
HH DSP    is the high-demand price 
and  )(
LL DSP    is the low-demand price in the deregulated case.  Then, assume the regulated 
price   RP   falls between the high-demand and low-demand prices,  HRL PPP  .   
Next, assume all NGUs require occasional planned maintenance that takes the unit 
offline. Also, assume a NGU operator wants to maximize profit and has the ability to schedule 
planned output-reducing maintenance.  Thus, an operator can choose to schedule maintenance 
either in the high- or low-demand period. 
                                                             
14 Market power can be an important factor in electricity markets and is one of the reasons for historically strong 
relegation in the sector.  For instance, Mansur (2008) finds that wholesale market inefficiencies brought on by 
market power can increase production costs 3% - 8% above competitive levels.   
15 Recall this model is built to analyze how NGUs perceive the demand, and since NGUs make up a relatively small 
portion of total capacity and electricity demand always exceeds that capacity.  Thus demand from the NGU 
perspective is always vertical. 
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Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the model.  Without lost of generality, 
assume the first x amount of the type-V generation belongs to a single NGU.  In the short-run, 
profit for this NGU is just the difference between price and marginal cost given by the supply 
curve, multiplied by capacity.  The bold black line denotes the supply curve   )(QS .  Thus, 
under deregulated pricing and during a high-demand period, the NGU’s profit is the area A+B+C 
in Figure 3.  However, if demand is low, then profit falls to area C only.  Meanwhile, given 
regulated pricing, the NGU’s profit is always area B+C, regardless of demand.  Therefore, 
ranking profits finds: 
 
       HdHrLrLd DDDD   (3) 
 
where     is short-run profit given the demand level, and the superscript denotes deregulated (d) 
or regulated (r) pricing.   
The ranking of short-run profits confirms two facts about the model. First, maximizing 
profit under deregulated pricing requires scheduling output-reducing maintenance for low-
demand periods (when not operating has the lowest opportunity cost).  Second, profits are the 
same under regulated pricing regardless of demand.          
However, when a NGU of size x is unavailable to meet demand, area D in Figure 3 is the 
increased cost of using a type-L unit instead of the type-V unit in the low-demand case 
(assuming sufficient unused capacity of type-L units).  Yet, area E+F+G is the increased cost in 
the high-demand case of using a type-H unit instead of the type-V unit (noting areas D and G are 
the same size).  Thus, the change in total cost   TC   when the NGU of x size is unavailable to 
meet demand can be ranked: 
 
       .0 HdHrLrLd DTCDTCDTCDTC   (4) 
 
Comparing expressions (4) with (3) shows that deregulated pricing aligns the incentives of the 
NGU operator with social welfare, while regulated pricing does not.  Under regulated pricing an 
operator has the same opportunity cost of maintenance in both demand scenarios  
    HrLr DD  , but the social cost of the NGU outage is higher in the high-demand 
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scenario      LrHr DTCDTC  .  Meanwhile, deregulated pricing means a lower opportunity 
cost of maintenance in the low-demand period     HdLd DD  , and the lower opportunity 
cost corresponds with smaller increases in the total cost of generation     HdLd DTCDTC  .   
Thus, deregulated pricing aligns the NGU operator’ incentives with the interests of society.  
 In summary, the maintenance-allocation efficiency gain is the reduction in total 
generation costs when planned maintenance occurs in low-demand periods instead of in high-
demand periods. 
 
3.B Daily Setup: Empirical Strategy 
This section develops the empirical strategy to measure the impact of divestiture and price 
deregulation on the maintenance-allocation efficiency at U.S. NGUs.  The estimation equations 
below are similar in spirit to equations (1) and (2) used in the monthly data section above, but 
adapted for the daily data.   
At any moment, a non-retired or mothballed electricity generating unit may not be generating 
electricity for many reasons that can be placed into four general categories: 
1. Not Dispatched: not generating due to lack of demand, but could generate if demand 
were sufficient; 
2. Unplanned Outage: not able to generate, for unplanned reasons such as emergency 
repairs; 
3. Planned Outage: not able to generate, for planned reasons, usually related to scheduled 
maintenance; 
4. Refueling Period (nuclear units only):  not able to generate, as reactor is offline to 
facilitate refueling the reactor core. 
NGUs are baseload units with low variable-costs and thus always dispatch when available.  That 
is, when an NGU is not generating, I assume one of items 2-4 on the list above holds (hereafter 
known at the “full-dispatch” assumption).  For infra-marginal baseload units, wholesale price is 
essentially exogenous.  Under these assumptions, the ideal setup to measure the maintenance-
allocation efficiency gains can be described as follows.  First, randomly assign each NGU to 
either deregulated pricing or regulated pricing.   Second, as demand varies measure output at 
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each NGU and record why the NGU may not be generating a full capacity.  Third, when demand 
is high test to see if planned maintenance is lower and output is higher at price deregulated 
NGUs compared to regulated units.   
First, however, the ideal setup to measure the maintenance-allocation efficiency gains did 
not occur since a randomized experiment did not take place.  Instead, price deregulation occurred 
on a state-by-state and unit-by-unit basis leading to the possibility of selection.
16
  Yet, even 
without the random assignment, I can still measure the observed effect of price deregulation on 
maintenance-allocation efficiency after addressing several issues that complicate the empirical 
strategy. 
 Second, the actual demand for each NGU’s service area is unobserved.  As a proxy 
variable to indicate periods of high demand, I use the maximum daily temperature (MAX) in 
Summer months of June, July, and August (where the binary variable SUMMER is 1, and 0 
otherwise).  The model above predicts that a higher demand implies a higher opportunity cost of 
maintenance.  Under marginal pricing, however, the relationship between demand and price is 
not linear due to the shape of the supply curve.  At the high-end of the supply curve, increase 
supply becomes increasingly expensive; that is, the supply curve is convex.  Not employing the 
high-cost units in the tail of the supply curve provides the efficiency gains.  Therefore, I apply 
the non-linear function f(·) to the variable MAX, where f(·) may be parametric or non-parametric.  
 Third, nuclear generating units generally operate only at 100% of capacity or at 0% of 
capacity; that is, a NGU is virtually either “on” or “off” as it do not make sense to operate at less 
than full capacity when the unit is available.  Thus, it makes sense to define a binary outcome 
variable to indicate when a NGU is operating at less than 100% output (L100) instead of a 
continuous output variable.  In other words, L100 takes the value 1 if the NGU is operating at 
less than 100% capacity.  In addition, assume that the researcher can identify when a NGU 
performs planned maintenance, and then define the variable MAINT to take the value 1 if  
L100=1 because of planned maintenance and zero otherwise. 
In the end, equation (5) is the basic reduced-form equation estimated using a linear 
probability model.  It mimics equation (2), in that both regulatory variables – DIV for divestiture 
and EWG for price deregulation – are included in the estimating equation: 
 
                                                             
16 One possibility is that NGUs with higher expected profits from marginal pricing lobbied harder for deregulation.   
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    EWGMAXSUMMERIPPMAXSUMMERMAINT  ff 210  . (5) 
 
The parameter of primary interest is 2 .  If a maintenance-allocation efficiency gain exists, then 
the model can reject the null hypothesis that 02  , in favor of  02  .  The implication is that 
during high-demand periods, if a NGU is a price-deregulated exempt wholesale generator 
(EWG), then it has fewer instances of operating at less than 100% of capacity due to planned 
maintenance.  The magnitude of  2   enables me to calculate of the size of the maintenance-
allocation efficiency gain. 
 
4 Daily Setup: Data and Results 
The first sub-section details the daily data, including the important Power Reactor Status Reports 
(PRSPs).  The second sub-section reports the main estimation results, interprets the result, and 
completes robustness checks.  
 
4.A Data 
4.A.1 Power Reactor Status Reports 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is the Federal agency responsible for regulating 
commercial nuclear power plants in the United States.  The NRC collects daily information 
between 4 am and 8 am about each of the operational NGUs.  Each day, the NRC releases a 
preliminary Power Reactor Status Report (PRSP) with each unit’s reactor power level (0-100%).  
Additional information is released in a final report after a 28 day lag.  I collected the daily PRSPs 
for all 104 NGUs from 1999 to 2008 (although I exclude Browns Ferry 1 from empirical analysis 
so that the sample includes 103 units as Brown Ferry 1 had an extremely long outage during the 
observation period due to technical problems).  Table 6 describes the fields included in the final 
daily PRSPs.  Figure 4 provides an example of the raw data as found on the NRC’s website and 
shows how the fields described in Table 6 are displayed.   
The PRSR Power Level provides a good measure of the daily generation at each NGU 
despite being observed only once per day.  At a monthly aggregate level, official U.S. Energy 
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Information Agency (EIA) generation data confirm that the PRSR Power Level provides a good 
estimate of total generation.  The reason is that EIA generation data at the NGU-level have a 
0.995 correlation with PRSR Power Levels converted into electricity output using NGU capacity 
and summed by month.
17
  At the aggregate annual level, total NGU generation calculated using 
the PRSRs deviate from official EIA data by less than 0.5 percent for every observed year. Also, 
the PRSRs match known events, such as the black-out that occurred across most of the 
Northeastern U.S. on August 14, 2003, where PRSRs record each reactor “scram” at many 
Northeastern NGUs on that date.  A “scram” is an unplanned, immediate shutdown of a nuclear 
reactor.
18
 
 Figure 5 plots the percentage of days observed at each Power Level for all NGUs from 
1999 to 2008.  The figure shows that NGUs operate at 100 Power Level for nearly 80% of the 
daily observations, and at 0 Power Level for approximately 10% of the observations. The 
remaining Power Levels are clustered near the 100% level.  From 1999 to 2008, the 104 U.S. 
NGUs had only 23.5% of days with Power Level less than 100 (i.e. L100=1). 
 The data demonstrate time dependency in the ordering of days with Power Level less 
than 100.  Time dependency comes from lengthy periods of outage when refueling a reactor, and 
from multi-day repairs when conducting other maintenance.  Thus, the sequencing and duration 
of days when NGUs operate at level less than maximum power become important characteristics 
of the data.  The 1999 to 2008 PRSRs report that NGUs had approximately 7700 blocks of 
consecutive days with L100=1, with an average outage period of 11.4 days (where an “outage 
period” is a number of consecutive days with L100=1). However, the median outage period is 
only 2 days. 
 The other fields in the final PRSRs allow the categorization of Power Levels below 100% 
into three groups: unplanned outage, fuel cycle, and planned maintenance.  Unplanned outage is 
the first and easiest group to determine, as 70% of all unplanned outages begin with a reactor 
scram [Rothwell (1990)].  Therefore, the Scrams field in the PRSRs provides a good 
approximation for unplanned outages at NGUs.  Define the variable SCRAM as a binary variable 
                                                             
17 This correlation statistic only applies for the years 2003-2008, since the EIA did not collect NGU-level generation 
data for the years 2001-2002 (during those years plant-level generation was collected). 
18 David et al. (1996) find that after the Three Mile Island incident, the probability of a reactor scram at U.S. NGUs 
fell significantly.   
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equal to 1 if  L100=1 and the Scram field is non-zero (indicating at least one scram occurred in 
the past 24 hours).   
The fuel cycle is the next and most difficult to identify reason why a NGU is not 
generating electricity.  Refueling a reactor is a planned event that can take weeks to complete, 
where the reactor needs to be shut down while fuel rods are removed and replaced.  The basic 
methodology to identify a refueling period is to search the Comments field in the PRSRs to find 
words like “refuel” (recalling that the Comment field only contains information if the Power 
Level is less than 100%).  Next, assign all concurrently adjacent days with L100=1 to be in the 
same fuel cycle, and define the binary variable FUEL=1 if a NGU is in a fuel cycle (where all 
fuel cycles below 10 days and above 50 days were checked for accuracy).  The data reveal that 
from 1999 to 2008 the average U.S. NGU conducted approximately one fuel cycle every 1.5 
years, with a median outage period of 56 days during refueling.  Refueling cycles are usually 
planned for the fall and spring months when electricity demand is low (DW (2012)).     
The final classification consists of all observations where a NGU is not at 100% Power 
Level and not classified as either SCRAM=1 or FUEL=1.  Since these outages are neither 
unplanned outages due to scrams nor refueling periods, then all remaining outages must be 
planned maintenance.
19
  Thus, I define the binary variable MAINT to take the value 1 if L100=1 
and SCRAM=0 and FUEL=0.  From 1999-2008, the median U.S. NGU has 23 days per year 
classified as MAINT=1.   
In summary, I use the PRSPs to generate four variables.  Table 7 provides a brief 
description of these binary variables as well as summary data.  The table shows that an NGU is 
refueling for a narrow majority of the time when its reactor has a Power Level less than 100%.  
However, planned maintenance is an important reason why a NGU may be operating at less than 
100% of capacity.  
 
4.A.2 Other Datasets 
I combine three additional datasets with the Power Reactor Status Reports (RPSRs) to form the 
final dataset used in the econometric analysis.   
                                                             
19 Here, I implicitly assume all unplanned outages are accurately measured by the SCRAM variable.  If this 
measurement error is not correlated with pricing regime, then the point estimate for the maintenance-allocation 
efficiency gain is still unbiased. 
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A series of unit-level characteristics come from the NGU roster provided by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission including reactor type and commercial operation start date (used to 
derive age).  These variables help control differences across NGUs.  For instance, an older NGU 
might require more maintenance per year than a newer NGU. 
Data from the U.S. National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
provide daily maximum temperature at weather stations across the United States (specifically, I 
use the Quality Controlled Local Climatological Data (QCLCD) from 1999-2008).  I map each 
NGU to the closest weather station using longitude and latitude coordinates.
20
 
Recall that equation (5) allows for a non-linear function of the maximum daily 
temperature, called f(MAX).  The main specification in this chapter use a non-parametric, non-
linear function defined by grouping observation by ranges of temperature and creating a series of 
dummy variables indicating the group to which an observation belongs.  I define the six groups 
such that approximately 10% of the observations from each tail of the temperature distribution 
are assigned to the lowest and highest temperature groups.  Table 8 shows the chosen 
temperature groups and reports the percentage of Summer temperature observations that fall 
within each group.  For example, part of f(MAX) can be defined as MAX × TempCat6 (which 
takes the maximum temperature only for the observations with a maximum temperature greater 
than 95 degrees F).  The data show that 10.56% of the observations are in the highest 
temperature group.
21
      
 Finally, since NGUs have an unequal distribution across geographic locations, then 
NGUs are not necessarily equally represented across temperature categories.  After reviewing the 
data, I find that 3 units have over 90% of their Summer MAX observations in category 6; these 
three units are located at the same plant in Arizona.  Also, 2 units at a plant in Texas have almost 
50% of their Summer MAX observations in category 6.  The main estimation results include the 5 
units with high category 6 percentages, but estimates from regressions that omit these units find 
no statistical difference in outcomes.  All NGUs have some observations in temperature category 
6. 
                                                             
20 Auffhammer and Kellogg (2011) discuss a detailed methodology of matching a different NOAA weather dataset 
to U.S. EPA’s air quality monitoring stations.  However, they can cross-reference some data fields common to both 
datasets, but the RPSRs have no weather data and thus I cannot due to same cross-referencing procedure. 
 
21 Robustness checks of the main results control for the unequal distribution of NGUs across temperature groups, 
and find no evidence of selection biasing the results. 
20 
 
 
4.B Daily Setup: Results 
The main estimation equation is given by: 
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where the function    yx   takes the value   yx    if    0 yx , and zero otherwise.  
Equation (6) is a linear probability model where the dependent variable (Yit) can be any of the 
four dependent variables shown earlier in Table 7, for unit (NGU) i , plant j, and day t.  The main 
findings focus on results when Yit=MAINT, since the goal is to identify the maintenance-
allocation efficiency gains.  The other dependent variables act as falsification tests and provide 
further insight into NGU behavior.  Equation (6) implements a piecewise linear spline in 
temperature to account for differential effects on divestiture and price deregulation.  In 
particular, the theory above suggests one would find evidence of maintenance-allocation 
efficiency gains due to price deregulation concentrated on high temperature days.  Using the 
temperature groups defined in Table 8, means that both 1  and 2  are each a vector of six 
parameters (one parameter for each of the temperature groups k=1,…,6).  Plant-level fixed 
effects   jPlant   account for any anomalies with the mapping of NOAA temperature data to the 
NGUs, since all NGUs at the same plant are assigned the same daily temperature (and clustering 
of the standard error also occurs at the plant-level).  Finally, the ellipses serve as a placeholder 
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for all the lower-level interactions between variables that are included in the regression but 
omitted from the notation.   
   
4.B.1 Daily Setup: Estimation Results – Basic 
Before estimating equation (6) in full, I first estimate a limited version that removes all 
divestiture variables, but keeps the price regulation variables.  That is, I estimate: 
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Table 9 reports selected parameter estimates using equation (7), where columns [1]-[4] contain 
the name of the dependent variable, and beginning with Yit=MAINT (see column [1]).  The table 
reports the estimates of  2   for each of the six temperature groups.  For reporting purposes, the 
temperature variable (MAX) is dividing by 100 to give hundredths of degree meaning that the 
reported coefficients are two orders of magnitude large than they would have been if the 
temperature variable was left in full degrees Fahrenheit.        
The estimate for  Bin 6  of -11.61 is statistically significant and implies that deregulated 
pricing leads to fewer planned outages on the very high temperature days – in other words, 
maintenance-allocation efficiency gains.  Since MAX is measured in hundredths of degrees, the 
estimate -11.6 means that a one degree increase in the maximum Summer daily temperature for 
group 6 reduces the probability of planned maintenance at those NGUs by approximately 0.11 
percentage points, if the NGU has exempt wholesale generator status (noting that all the lower 
spline levels essentially sum to a zero slope).  The lower temperature groups do not exhibit 
evidence of the maintenance-allocation efficiency gain, with no significant coefficients for 
estimates of 2  for lower temperate groups.  This result is consistent with a non-linear 
relationship between demand and price.  As the next section details, this reduction in planned 
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outage translates to $17.7 million annual maintenance-allocation efficiency gain from exempt 
whole generator NGUs. 
Table 9 column [2] reports results when the dependent variable is SCRAM.  The model 
finds a statistically significant increase in the probability of a reactor scram during high 
temperature days (with a coefficient estimate of 2.02 for temperature group 6).  This result is 
surprising, as scrams are usually seen as random events, but if a NGU defers maintenance in 
order to earn large short-run profits allowed by marginal pricing, then perhaps a reactor scram is 
more likely.  Table 9 columns [3] and [4] report estimates with the dependent variable is FUEL 
and L100, respectively.  Essentially, L100 is a combination of the other three dependent 
variables, and so its coefficient estimates are close to the sum of the coefficient estimates from 
the other three models.  The coefficient of FUEL is also marginally positive, but this result does 
not hold-up under robustness checks (specifically, adding the lag of L100, as outages have strong 
serial correlation when a reactor is refueling). 
Next, I estimate another limited version of equation (6) that eliminates covariates that 
include the price-deregulation variable and leaves only the divestiture variable (swap DIV for 
EWG in equation (7)).  That is, I check for maintenance-allocation efficiency gains just from 
divestiture (DIV), although none are expected and thus this estimation servers as a falsification 
test.  Table 10 reports coefficient estimates from four separate regressions, one column for each 
of the dependent variables (as in Table 9).  The results in Table 10 show only a marginally 
significant result temperature group 6 using MAINT as the dependent variable, but the coefficient 
is positive and thus has the wrong sign for maintenance-allocation efficiency gains. 
Finally, I estimate the complete equation (6) that includes both the divestiture and price 
deregulation variables.  Table 11 reports only results for the MAINT variable as that is our main 
dependent variable of interest.  The main coefficients of interest reported in Table 11 have 
similar values to those reported in Tables 9 and 10, respectively. That is, in the full specification, 
the maintenance-allocation efficiency gains from price deregulation are still statistically 
significant.   
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4.B.2 Daily Setup: Estimation Results – Interpretation 
Recall that the baseline estimate of -11.61 for temperature group 6 means that that, on days 
where the maximum temperature exceeds 95 degrees F, a one degree increase in the maximum 
Summer daily temperature reduces the probability of planned maintenance at a NGU by about 
0.12 percentage points, if the NGU has exempt wholesale generator status (recalling temperature 
is measured in tenths).  However, this estimate is difficult to interpret.  This section aids in the 
interpretation of the estimated probability and tries to calculate a dollar value for the 
maintenance-allocation efficiency gains.  I divide the cost calculation into three parts: variable 
operation and maintenance costs, fuel costs, and environmental compliance costs.  Adding all 
these costs together yields an annual maintenance allocation efficiency gain of $17.7 million 
after summing across all EWG reactors.  However, if the result generalizes to all NGUs, then 
maintenance allocation efficiency gains would be about $50.0 million (as about one-fourth of the 
NGU fleet is exempt wholesale generators). 
 
Variable Operation and Maintenance (VOM) Costs. To begin, note that the Summer months 
(June, July, and August) have 91 potential days of operation.  Next, the mean Summer 
temperature for temperature group 6 is 99.2 degrees F, with a standard deviation of 4.5 degrees 
(derived from the variable MAX using the 10.56 percent of observation in the group for the years 
in my sample).  Applying a 4.5 degree increase to the 0.12 percentage points fall in the 
maintenance outage probability yields a 0.50 percentage point decrease in outage probability 
during temperature group 6 days.  Multiplying the percentage of observations in temperature 
group 6 and the number of EWG NGUs (29), to find that 1.4 planned outage days would be 
eliminated each Summer across all EWG NGUs.  
The next step is to convert outage days into cost.  The variable operating cost (excluding 
fuel) of U.S. NGUs is on average is 0.78 mills/kWh in 2010 dollars [U.S. EPA (2006)].  
Meanwhile, the variable operating cost of combined turbine “peaker” units range from 2.75 – 
10.11 mills/kWh in 2010 dollars (with a non-weighted average of 6.43 mills/kWh) [U.S. EPA 
(2006)].  Thus, the difference in variable operating cost between a NGU and “peaker” unit is 
5.65 mills/kWh (where a mill is a tenth of a cent).  Recall, an average NGU has a capacity of 
1000 MW, while the average gas-fired “peaker” unit is only 25 MW.  Thus, if an NGU does not 
operate on a high-demand day, then it take nearly 40 “peaker” units coming online to satisfy that 
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demand.  Therefore, a NGU missing one hour of peak demand increases total electricity costs 
$226,000.   
Assume each NGU maintenance day with a maximum daily temperature in temperature 
group 6 has six peak hours per day where “peaker” units are needed to meet demand.  So, 
multiply the number of reduced planned outage days (1.4) times the cost per hour to fill demand 
by “peakers” times six hours per day, to find a maintenance-allocation efficiency gain of $1.9 
million per year from lower VOM costs at EWG NGUs.   
 
Fuel Costs.  MIT (2009) calculates fuel costs of $7/MWh for the average NGU.  In contrast, for 
peaker units with a heat rate of 13,300 Btu/KWh [U.S. EPA (2006)] and $4/mmBtu for natural 
gas, then fuel cost is $53.2/MWh.  That is, the fuel cost difference between a NGU and a peaker 
unit is $46.2/MWh and equal to 46.2 mills/kWh.  Therefore, maintenance-allocation efficiency 
gain at EWG NGUs of $15.5 million per year from lower fuel costs (after scaling the gain from 
VOM calculation above).   
 
Environmental Compliance. Using data from U.S. EPA (2006) I calculate that the average 
combustion turbine peaking unit without emission controls has a NOX emission rate of 1.73 
lbs/mmBtu.  I then assume any peaker unit that operates during high demand days in the Summer 
much comply with a NOX permit trading program.  At $3000 per permit to emit one ton of NOX 
[Burtraw & Szambelan (2009)], the extra 100 tons of NOX that peakers units would have to 
purchase permits in order to operate are worth about $300,000.  I combine all of the above costs 
to get the total maintenance allocation efficiency gains at EWG NGUs. 
 
4.B.3 Daily Setup: Estimation Results – Robustness  
This section conducts a series of robustness check to determine the sensitivity of the basic 
results.  Overall, I find no practical differences between the basic estimation results above and 
the results from these robustness cases. (These results are not shown in tables.) 
 
Add Lag L100 Variable. To begin, I add the lag of the L100 variable, as reactor outages are 
correlated in time.  During refueling periods, once the spent fuel is removed, the entire refueling 
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process must be completed before the reactor can come back online.  Yet, adding the lag of L100 
to the set of controls does not significantly change results when using MAINT as the dependent 
variable.   
 
Unit-Level Characteristics. The baseline model already includes plant-level fixed effects, but it 
is useful to check if adding time-varying observable unit-level characteristics significantly 
changes the results.  Specifically, I add the cubic of age (as was done for the output-level 
estimations).  Adding these additional control variables does not significantly change the 
baseline estimation results (noting that the additional controls are in a separate vector and thus do 
not interacted with season or temperature variables).    
 
Time Fixed-Effects. Here, year-month fixed-effects along with day of the week fixed-effects are 
added to the baseline model.  The use of finely delineated time fixed-effects is similar to 
estimating a time-trend and may even be call a “non-parametric time-trend”.  Interestingly, in 
level terms, planned maintenance is then lower on weekend days than weekdays.  However, the 
coefficients of interest are not significantly affected when adding the time fixed-effects. 
 
Truncated Data. The next robustness check removes the two plants (five units) with high 
temperature group 6 representation as these plants are located in Texas and Arizona where the 
average Summer temperature are above the national average.  The concern is that these five units 
with their large weight in group 6 are biasing the results.  After removing these units and 
rerunning the baseline model with the truncated dataset, the estimates do not change 
significantly. 
 
Relative Temperature.  As a final check, I create temperature categories relative to the average 
of the daily high temperatures for the observed years 1999-2008, and find evidence of 
maintenance-allocation efficiency gains. 
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4.B.4 Daily Setup: Monthly Variation 
To investigate month variation in the maintenance-allocation efficiency gains, I estimate 
equation (7) on a month-by-month basis while excluding the Summer dummy variable.  
However, since days with a high maximum temperature over 95 degrees F do not occur in all 
months, then on a month-by-month basis the model only yields an estimate for temperature 
category 6 for the months of June, July, August, and September.  The coefficient estimates for 
Bin 6  are negative for June, July, and August; although, the estimates are smaller than those 
reported in Table 9 and only statistically significant for August.  In contrast, the coefficient 
estimate for Bin 6 in September is positive and statistically significant.  Due to the Summer 
dummy in equation (7) the coefficient estimate reported in Table 9 is the difference between a 
weighted average of the estimates for the Summer months and September’s estimate.  Finding a 
positive coefficient estimate in September is initially unexpected.  However, auto-correlation in 
temperature across months can explain this result.  That is, by September a NGU operator no 
longer has the option to defer maintenance as was done during a hot Summer, and thus 
maintenance is more likely to occur on hot days in September, all else equal.  Indeed, there is a 
positive correlation in month-to-month mean temperatures for the Summer months, with a 
correlation of 0.40 between August and September for the year 1999-2008.  Further research is 
needed to model and interpret the dynamic nature of maintenance optimization. 
 
5 Costs and Deregulation 
In this section, I use an unexplored dataset on actual production costs at U.S. NGUs to test 
whether differences in regulatory status can be explained by differences in NGU production 
costs.  Due to the “stranded cost” problem, the literature suggests that states whose NGUs have 
high fixed costs are most likely to deregulate.
22
  As suggestive evidence, DW (2012) finds that 
divested NGUs have slightly higher construction costs than non-divested NGUs; however, the 
difference in construction costs is small (and not statistically significant).  I find divested reactors 
                                                             
22
As Joskow (1997) explains, “Regulated retail prices reflect the amortization of the sunk costs associated with past 
regulator-approved investment in generating plants (for example, nuclear plants)… [while] the short-run 
unregulated price of electricity in the wholesale market today is about 2.5 cents/kWh, and the long-run marginal 
cost is in the 3-4 cents/kWh range…  [Thus], there is a “price gap”…  If generation services were instantly priced at 
the current and projected market values in those areas where the price gap is positive, the net present value of the 
losses to utilities would be on the order of $100 billion.  Electricity sector reform efforts at the state level have been 
concentrated in states where the [price] gap is largest [p.126-7].” 
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have higher fixed operation and maintenance (FOM) costs than non-divested reactors, and that 
difference is both statistically and economically significant.  Divested reactors also have higher 
variable operation and maintenance (VOM) costs compared to non-divested reactors.  However, 
price-deregulated reactors have FOM and VOM costs that are statistically that same as divested-
only reactors.   
 The data come from the U.S. EPA (2006) and provide a snapshot of FOM and VOM in 
2004 for operational NGUs.
23
  To initially explore the data, Figure 6 plots the fixed operation 
and maintenance costs and the variable operation and maintenance costs for the 103 U.S. NGUs 
in my sample.  FOM is measured in dollars per kilowatt per year ($/kW-year) and plotted on the 
vertical axis.  I find that FOM ranges from 90.2 to 233.1 with an un-weighted average of 143.8 
and a standard deviation of 31.7 $/kW-year.  This means a 1000 MW reactor has average annual 
fixed costs of almost $150 million.
24
  Meanwhile, VOM is measured in mills per kilowatt-hour 
(mills/kWh) and plotted on the horizontal axis of Figure 6 (where one mill is a tenth of one cent).  
I find that VOM ranges from 0.37 to 1.28 with an un-weighted average of 0.70 (and a standard 
deviation of 0.19).  Thus, a 1000 MW reactor operating at 90 percent capacity factor has average 
annual variable costs of approximately $5.5 million (not including fuel costs).
25
  In other words, 
NGUs have high fixed costs and relatively low variable costs.  Interestingly, Figure 6 shows that 
both FOM and VOM vary greatly across NGUs, but within NGUs I find a strong correlation 
between FOM and VOM as the two cost measures have an un-weighted correlation coefficient of 
0.932 (and the coefficient is unchanged if weighted by capacity).  Finally, the data are plotted by 
regulatory status: never divested, ever divested only, and ever price deregulated.  Here, “never 
divested” means that a reactor is not divested by the end of my sample period, “ever divested 
only” means that a reactor is divested before the end of my sample period but not price 
deregulated before the end of my sample period, and “ever price deregulated” means that a 
reactor is price deregulated before the end of my sample period that concludes that the end of 
                                                             
23 See Appendix 4-4 titled “VOM and FOM Cost Assumptions for Existing Nuclear Units”.  According to the 
Integrated Planning Model documentation the unit-level cost characteristics come from the U.S. EIA’s Annual 
Energy Outlook 2006 and then vetted by EPA stakeholders.  
 
24 MIT (2009) reports the capital costs associated with the construction of a new NGU at $4000/kW.  Thus, 
construction of a new 1000MW NGU is predicted to cost $4 billion or an order of magnitude larger than the annual 
FOM cost of approximately $150 million for a reactor of the same size. 
 
25 MIT (2009) calculates fuel costs at $7/MWh (equal to 7 mills/KWh) or an order of magnitude large than VOM.  
Thus, a 1000 MW reactor operating at 90 percent availability has annual average fuel cost of more than $55 million. 
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2009.  Figure 6 shows that ever divested only and ever price deregulated reactors are higher cost 
than never divested reactors, where higher cost is farther up-and-right in the figure. 
Table 12 reports average FOM and VOM by regulatory status.  Panel A shows that 
divested reactors have higher FOM and VOM costs compared to never divested reactors, and the 
differences are statistically significant.  Specifically, the average ever divested reactor has FOM 
costs of 158.4 $/kW-year compared to 131.1 $/kW-year for the average never divested reactor, 
while for VOM the averages are 0.78 and 0.64 mills/kWh, respectively.  In contrast, Panel B 
shows that reactors that were ever price deregulated do not have statistically different FOM costs 
from units that were only ever divested (167.5 vs. 152.4), but the VOM is statistically greater for 
the ever price deregulated reactors (0.85 vs. 0.73).  However, the statistical comparisons in Table 
12 do not account for differences in reactor characteristics, such as age, that might account for 
differences in costs. 
 Regression analysis allows me to control for a wide variety of observable reactor 
characteristics and then check whether differences regulatory status are correlated with 
difference in operation costs.  Unfortunately, the data provide only a snapshot of costs across 
reactors, so the regression analyses in this section rely solely on cross-sectional data.  Thus, the 
estimation equations in this section are similar to those in section 2, but remove the time 
dimension of analysis.  Specifically, the estimation equations are 
     
iiii XY   110 DIV_ever][1  (8) 
 
and 
 
iiiii XY   1210 EWG_ever][1DIV_ever][1  (9) 
 
where the dependent variable (Yi) is either FOM or VOM for reactor i.  Here, the indicator 
variable 1[DIV_ever] takes the value one if a reactor is ever divested, and similarly the indicator 
variable 1[EWG_ever] takes the value one if a reactor is ever price deregulated.  These variables 
are analogous to variables 1[DIV] and 1[EWG] above, but do not vary over time.  A vector of 
reactor-specific, time-invariant characteristics are included in Xi, such as Census Division 
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location dummies to control for local cost difference not associated with regulatory status 
differences.  The main parameter of interest in equation (8) is 
1 , where analysis of the 
“stranded-cost problem” problem predicts that 01   when Yi=FOM.  However, I am also 
interested in the sign and statistical significance of 1  when Yi=VOM, although theory does not 
suggest the sign of 
1  in this case.  For equation (9), I am interested in the sign and significant of 
both 1  and 2 , when Yi=FOM or Yi=VOM.  Note that Xi cannot include capacity as an 
explanatory variable, since FOM and VOM already normalized by capacity and thus including 
capacity in the regressions creates a mechanical negative correlation. 
 Table 13 Panel A reports the coefficient estimates for  
1   when using (8) as the basic 
estimating equation and Yi=FOM.  Then Panel B reports coefficient estimates for  1   and  2   
when using (9) as the basic estimating equation.  The columns of Table 13 record the coefficient 
estimates under different sets of controls and error clustering.  Columns [1]-[4] provide estimates 
using subsets of the full control list, while columns [5]-[6] employ the full set of controls 
(although they differ in error structure).  Specifically, coefficient estimate in column [1] does not 
employ any controls, so in Panel A the estimate of 27.3 is just the difference between the two 
values in first row of Table 12.  The results in the next three columns control for various reactor-
level, time-invariant, observable characteristics: column [2] controls for a cubic function of 
reactor age (as of January 1
st
, 2004); column [3] controls for location using Census Division 
dummies; column [4] controls for other time-invariant characteristics including categorical 
variables for the number of units per plant, reactor type, containment type, and reactor design 
company.  Table 13 Panel A shows that adding these control variables does not statistically 
change the estimate of 1 , but simply increases the model fit as indicated by higher R
2
 values 
compared to 0.19 in column [1].  Next, column [5] employs the full set of controls, but again the 
estimate is statistically unchanged.  Finally, column [6] uses the full set of controls and clusters 
standard errors by plant to allow for correlation of costs across units within the same plant, and 
although clustering leads to larger standard errors the estimate is still highly significant.  Using 
the preferred specification in column [6], I find that ever divested reactors have FOM costs that 
are 25.2 $/kW-yr higher than never divested reactors (a value close to the standard deviation of 
the entire sample of 31.7 $/kW-year).  This difference is approximately $25 million annually for 
a 1000 MW reactor and thus economically significant.  Over 20 years of operation with a 
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discount rate of 10 percent, the net present value of this difference in FOM is over $200 million.  
The evidence here supports the theory that deregulation and divestiture is associate with high-
fixed cost generators.  
Again, Table 13 Panel B reports coefficient estimates for  1   and  2   when using (9) as 
the basic estimating equation and FOM as the dependent variable.  Although the estimate of 2  
is marginally positive in column [1], columns [2]-[6] show that adding controls lowers the point 
estimate until it is negative and not statistically significant.  That is, price deregulation is not 
associated with higher or lower FOM compared to divestiture.  In addition, the estimates of 1  in 
Panel B are not statistically different than the corresponding estimates in Panel A.  
Table 14 Panel A reports the coefficient estimates for  1   when using (8) as the basic 
estimating equation and Yi=VOM, while Panel B reports coefficient estimates for  1   and  2   
when using (9) as the basic estimating equation.  The columns of Table 8 have the same controls 
and clustering as the columns of Table 13.  Using the preferred specification in column [6], I find 
that ever divested reactors have VOM costs that are 0.16 mills/kWh higher than never divested 
reactors (a value close to the standard deviation of the entire sample of 0.19 mills/kWh).  This 
difference is approximately $1.3 million annually for a 1000 MW reactor operating at 90 percent 
capacity factor, so that over 20 years of operation with a discount rate of 10 percent, the net 
present value of this difference in VOM is just over $10 million.  Thus, the difference in fixed 
cost across regulatory status is much larger than the difference in variable cost.  Table 14 Panel B 
finds a similar pattern to Panel B in Table 13, although this is expected given the high correlation 
between FOM and VOM in the data.  That is, 2  is marginally positive without controls and the 
point estimate falls to a statistically insignificant negative value.  However, the negative point 
estimate provides suggestive evidence that price deregulated reactors have lower costs than 
divested only reactors, and thus earn higher short-run profits.
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26 Logit regressions of 1[DIV_ever] on FOM (or VOM) with controls finds that higher cost NGUs are more likely to 
be divested, although the controls are limited to the cubic function of age as the categorical variables tend to 
perfectly predict the binary outcome.  Then, logit regressions of 1[EWG_ever] on FOM (or VOM) with controls 
finds that cost does not significant predict the probability of price deregulation. 
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6 Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter finds statistically significant maintenance-allocation efficiency gains.  I then 
calculate the annual dollar value of the maintenance-allocation efficiency gains to be $17.7 
million dollars per year (if all U.S. NGU were in wholesale markets compared to under regulated 
pricing).  However, this dollar value for the total maintenance-allocation efficiency gains may be 
low for at least two reasons.  First, fuel costs are not included in the cost calculation.  If fuel 
costs are relatively low for nuclear units, then excluding fuel costs lowers the dollar value of the 
maintenance-allocation efficiency gain.  Second, environmental benefits are not included either, 
and some pollutants on high-temperature days cause more damages than on low-temperature 
days.  Since peaker units are fossil-fuel fired, their environmental impacts are an important real 
cost. 
Because this chapter covers only nuclear units, the result here provides a lower-bound for 
the maintenance-allocation efficiency gains due to market pricing in wholesale electricity 
markets.  It would be preferable to identify the effect on all U.S. EGUs, but the PRSRs only 
cover NGUs, and the reduced-form estimation methodology in this chapter cannot be extended to 
all EGUs.  Indeed, identifying the maintenance-allocation efficiency gains from marginal pricing 
at all EGUs requires a detailed structural model or other model variation no considered here.  
Finally, I acknowledge three issues that may lead to concerns about the results.  First, the 
variables generated from the PRSPs may not accurately capture actual operations at the NGUs.  
For instance, I assume that all outages categorized as OTHER were planned outages, since they 
did not fall under SCRAM or FUEL categories, and that assumption may not be accurate in all 
instances.  Second, the binary treatment variable EWG may not accurately reflect the true and 
complete state of electricity price deregulation at the wholesale level for each NGU.  Third, the 
result found in this chapter is specific to NGUs and may not apply to all EGUs, as mentioned 
above.  It is unclear how the maintenance-allocation efficiency gains from marginal pricing 
accrue to other types of generating units that do not satisfy the full-dispatch assumption needed 
for identification.  However, it seemly likely that maintenance-allocation efficiency gains accrue 
at all types of electricity generating units in wholesale electricity markets.
27
 
 
                                                             
27 Future research includes building a model of optimal maintenance in the style of Rothwell and Rust (1995, 1997).  
That is, future work entails building a structural model maintenance decisions instead of the reduced-form 
estimations in this paper.  
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Table and Figures 
 
Table 1: Comparing Divested with Non-Divested Nuclear Reactors  
  
Ever 
Divested  
Never 
Divested p-value 
 
(n=48) (n=55) [1] vs. [2] 
  [1] [2] [3] 
Mean Reactor Characteristics 
     Design capacity (in MWe) 921.9 959.7 0.38 
  Reactor age (as Dec. 1998) 18.8 18.4 0.74 
    Reactor Type, shares: 
     Pressurized water reactor 0.54 0.78 0.01 
  Boiling water reactor 0.46 0.22 0.01 
    Reactor Manufacturer, shares: 
     Westinghouse 0.42 0.51 0.35 
  General Electric 0.46 0.22 0.01 
  Combustion Engineering 0.08 0.18 0.15 
  Babcock and Wilcox 0.04 0.09 0.33 
    Reactor Location, shares: 
     Northeast census region 0.50 0.00 0.00 
  Midwest census region 0.38 0.18 0.03 
  South census region 0.13 0.67 0.00 
  West census region 0.00 0.15 0.01 
Notes: Sample includes all 103 nuclear power reactors operating in the United States as of 
January 1, 2000. Column [3] reports p-values from a test that the means are equal in the two 
subsamples. 
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Table 2: Comparing Only Divested with Both Divested and Priced Deregulated Nuclear 
Reactors 
  
Ever 
Divested & 
Price 
Deregulated 
Ever 
Divested 
Only  p-value 
 
(n=19) (n=29) [1] vs. [2] 
  [1] [2] [3] 
Mean Reactor Characteristics  
    Design capacity (in MWe) 865.0 959.2 0.16 
  Reactor age (as Dec. 1998) 21.0 17.3 0.09 
 
 
  Reactor Type, shares:  
    Pressurized water reactor 0.58 0.52 0.68 
  Boiling water reactor 0.42 0.48 0.68 
 
 
  Reactor Manufacturer, shares:  
    Westinghouse 0.37 0.49 0.59 
  General Electric 0.42 0.48 0.68 
  Combustion Engineering 0.16 0.03 0.14 
  Babcock and Wilcox 0.05 0.03 0.76 
 
 
  Reactor Location, shares:  
    Northeast census region 0.79 0.31 0.00 
  Midwest census region 0.11 0.55 0.00 
  South census region 0.11 0.14 0.74 
  West census region 0.14 0.00 0.00 
Notes: Sample includes only the 48 divested nuclear power reactors operating in the United 
States as of January 1, 2000. Column [3] reports p-values from test that the means are equal in 
the two subsamples. 
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Table 3: The Effect of Divestiture and Price Deregulation on Nuclear Operating 
Performance (net generation as a percent of design capacity) 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Panel A: Divestiture Only [Eq. (1)] 
1[Divested=DIV]it 5.9*** 9.4*** 9.2*** 9.4*** 8.9*** 
(std.dev.) (1.3) (2.1) (2.0) (2.0) (2.0) 
R
2
 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.24 
Panel B: Divestiture and Price Deregulation [Eq. (2)] 
1[Divested=DIV]it 6.3*** 9.8*** 9.8*** 10.0*** 9.3*** 
(std.dev.) (1.5) (2.4) (2.3) (2.3) (2.6) 
      1[Price Deregulated=EWG]it -1.1 -1.0 -1.4 -1.6 -0.8 
(std.dev.) (1.7) (3.1) (3.1) (3.3) (3.3) 
R
2
 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.24 
Panel C: Control and Weighting 
Year-Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reactor fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reactor age (cubic) No No Yes Yes Yes 
Weighted by reactor capacity No No No Yes No 
Dataset collapsed to plant level No No No No Yes 
Number of cross sectional units 103 103 103 103 65 
Observations 36,667 36,667 36,667 36,667 24,197 
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates and standard errors from five separate regressions.  
In all regressions the dependent variable is net generation as a percent of design capacity.  The 
sample includes monthly observation from 1970-2009 for all 103 nuclear power reactors 
operating in the United States as of January 1, 2000. Standard errors are clustered at the plant 
level. 
 *** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
   ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
     * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 4: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Regional Average Wholesale Prices 2000-
2009 (net generation as a percent of design capacity) 
  
[1] 
Eq. (1) 
[2] 
Eq. (2) 
Divested reactors in states with high prices   H1  7.9*** 6.4*** 
  (n=26) (2.4) (3.0) 
 
 
 
Divested reactors in states with low prices   L1  11.0*** 11.5*** 
  (n=22) (2.6) (3.6) 
 
 
 
Price deregulated reactors in states with high prices   H2   2.2 
(n=17)  (3.7) 
 
 
 
Price deregulated reactors in states with low prices   L2   -10.0 
  (n=2)  (6.7) 
 
 
 Year-Month fixed effects Yes Yes 
Reactor fixed effects Yes Yes 
Reactor age (cubic) Yes Yes 
 
 
 Observations 36,667 36,667 
R
2
 0.21 0.21 
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates and standard errors from two separate regressions.  
In all regressions the dependent variable is net generation as a percent of design capacity.  The 
sample includes monthly observation from 1970-2009 for all 103 nuclear power reactors 
operating in the United States as of January 1, 2000. Standard errors are clustered at the plant 
level. 
 *** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
   ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
     * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5: The Effect of Divestiture versus Price Deregulation on Nuclear Operating 
Performance – Considering Possible Concerns about Selection Bias 
 
Excluding 
West 
census 
region 
 
Excluding 
North- 
East 
census 
region 
 
Excluding 
Midwest 
census 
region 
 
Excluding 
South 
census 
region 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Panel A: Divestiture Only [Eq. (1)] 
1[Divested=DIV]it 8.5*** 10.2*** 6.2*** 12.9*** 
 
(2.0) (2.6) (2.2) (2.6) 
R
2
 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.22 
Panel B: Divestiture and Price Deregulation [Eq. (2)] 
1[Divested=DIV]it 9.1*** 11.7*** 5.5** 13.3*** 
 
(2.3) (2.6) (2.4) (2.7) 
 
 
   
1[Price Deregulated=EWG]it -1.3 -9.8*** 1.3 -0.7 
 
(3.1) (3.1) (3.4) (3.5) 
R
2
 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.22 
Year-Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reactor fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reactor age (cubic) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
   Number of reactors 95 79 75 60 
Observations 34,326 27,825 26,204 21,646 
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates and standard errors corresponding from four 
separate regressions.  In all regressions the dependent variable is net generation as a percent of 
design capacity.  The sample includes monthly observation from 1970-2009 for all 103 nuclear 
power reactors operating in the United States as of January 1, 2000. Standard errors are clustered 
at the plant level. 
 *** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
   ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
     * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 6: NRC Power Reactor Status Reports (PRSRs) Fields 
Name Data Type Description 
Date MM/DD/YYYY The date of the observation. 
Unit Name Text Field Unique name for each of the 104 NGUs. 
Power Level Positive 
Integer (0-100) 
Percentage of power reactor operating capacity 
for that Date. 
Down Date MM/DD/YYYY If a NGU has a 0 Power Level, Down Date 
records the beginning Date in the current 
sequence of 0 Power Level. 
Comment Text Field Description of the reason why a Power Level is 
less than 100. 
Report Change Binary (0/1) Equals 1 if the PRSR changed within the past 24 
hours. 
Scrams Positive  
Integer (0,1,2…) 
Number of reactor scrams within past 24 hours, 
where a “scram” is an unplanned reactor shut-
down. 
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Table 7: Binary Variable Categories Generated from PRSPs (1999-2008) 
Variable 
Name 
Fraction (%) Description 
L100 23.5 1 if Power Level less than 100%, and 0 otherwise 
SCRAM 0.2 1 if Power Level less than 100% and Scrams non-
zero, and 0 otherwise 
FUEL 12.4 1 if Power Level less than 100% and Comment 
contains words like “refuel”, indicating the NGU is 
refueling its reactor, and 0 otherwise. 
MAINT 11.0 1 if Power Level less than 100% and not 
categorized as SCRAM or FUEL, and 0 otherwise 
# Obs. 379912  
Notes: A NGU may have SCRAM=1 and FUEL=1 for the same observation date.  In some 
instances, FUEL=1 when L100=0.  Source: Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Power Reactor 
Status Reports [with author’s calculation]. 
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Table 8: Temperature Category Definitions 
Category Temperature Range (F) 
Percentage of Summer 
Temperature Observation within 
Cateogry 
1 (·,75) 
8.9 
2 [75,80) 
12.2 
3 [80,85) 
20.4 
4 [85,90) 
25.9 
5 [90,95) 
21.1 
6 [95,·) 
10.6 
Note: Cells subject to independent rounding. 
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Table 9: Estimates of 
it
EWG
j
MinTempCat
it
MAX
t
SUMMER 







  for each temperature bin 
(k=1,...,6) 
Independent  
\ Dependent 
MAINT [1] SCRAM [2] FUEL [3] L100 [4] 
Bin 1 -0.13 
[0.01] 
-0.03*** 
[0.01] 
0.00 
[0.15] 
-0.15 
[0.15] 
Bin 2 -1.00*** 
[0.27] 
0.08 
[0.05] 
1.99*** 
[0.52] 
1.14* 
[0.57] 
Bin 3 1.93** 
[0.61] 
-0.08 
[0.10] 
-2.91*** 
[0.88] 
-1.19 
[1.20] 
Bin 4 0.39 
[0.66] 
0.15 
[0.12] 
0.20 
[1.13] 
0.75 
[1.20] 
Bin 5 -2.37 
[1.52] 
-0.47* 
[0.24] 
1.70 
[1.56] 
-1.08 
[1.16] 
Bin 6 -11.61*** 
[2.09] 
2.02* 
[1.01] 
0.67 
[1.30] 
-8.89*** 
[2.27] 
Adjusted R-squared 0.19 0.00 0.04 
0.14 
# Observations 376,219 376,219 376,219 
376,219 
Notes: This table reports selected coefficient estimates and standard errors four separate 
regressions.  Standard errors are clustered at the plant level. 
 *** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
   ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
     * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 10: Estimates of Estimates of 
it
DIV
j
MinTempCat
it
MAX
t
SUMMER 







  for each 
temperature bin (k=1,...,6) 
Independent \ 
Dependent 
MAINT [1] SCRAM [2] FUEL [3] L100 [4] 
Bin 1 -0.02 
[0.13] 
-0.03*** 
[0.01] 
0.11 
[0.15] 
0.07 
[0.19] 
Bin 2 -0.19 
[0.33] 
0.03 
[0.04] 
0.44 
[0.51] 
0.33 
[0.54] 
Bin 3 0.25 
[0.48] 
-0.01 
[0.07] 
-0.44 
[0.76] 
-0.28 
[0.86] 
Bin 4 0.36 
[0.59] 
0.07 
[0.08] 
-1.05 
[0.62] 
-0.63 
[0.87] 
Bin 5 -0.97 
[0.81] 
-0.15 
[0.08] 
2.11* 
[0.90] 
0.97 
[0.86] 
Bin 6 1.85* 
[0.92] 
0.22 
[0.16] 
-1.45 
[1.00] 
0.71 
[0.97] 
Adjusted R-squared 0.19 0.00 0.04 
0.14 
# Observations 376,219 376,219 376,219 
376,219 
Notes: This table reports selected coefficient estimates and standard errors four separate 
regressions.  Standard errors are clustered at the plant level. 
 *** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
   ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
     * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 11: Estimates of effect of Divestiture  k1  and Price Deregulation  k2  in Full 
Specification for each temperature bin (k=1,...,6)  
1[DIV] MAINT 1[EWG] 
MAINT 
Bin 1 0.17 
[0.34] 
Bin 1 -0.27 
[0.31] 
Bin 2 0.00 
[0.64] 
Bin 2 -0.93 
[0.63] 
Bin 3 -0.54 
[0.50] 
Bin 3 2.34** 
[0.74] 
Bin 4 0.43 
[0.77] 
Bin 4 -0.02 
[0.90] 
Bin 5 -0.01 
[0.85] 
Bin 5 -2.23 
[1.55] 
Bin 6 1.38 
[0.85] 
Bin 6 -12.90*** 
[2.11] 
Adjusted R-squared 0.19 
 
# Observations 376,219 
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates and standard errors for a single regression.  
Standard errors are clustered at the plant level. 
 *** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
   ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
     * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 12: Cost Characteristics by Regulation Status (2004 Dollars) 
Panel A: Divestiture 
 
   
 
Ever 
Divested 
Never Divested p-value 
 
(n=48) (n=55) [1] vs. [2] 
 [1] [2] [3] 
  Fixed O&M ($/kW-year) 158.4 131.1 0.00 
    (std.dev.) (30.7) (27.0) 
   Variable O&M (mills/kWh) 0.78 0.64 0.00 
    (std.dev.) (0.17) (0.18) 
 
    Panel B: Price Deregulation 
  
Ever 
Divested & 
Price 
Deregulated 
Ever 
Divested Only  p-value 
 
(n=19) (n=29) [1] vs. [2] 
 [1] [2] [3] 
  Fixed O&M ($/kW-year) 167.5 152.4 0.10 
    (std.dev.) (24.2) (33.3) 
   Variable O&M (mills/kWh) 0.85 0.73 0.02 
    (std.dev.) (0.14) (0.18) 
 
    Notes: Sample includes all 103 nuclear power reactors operating in the United States as of 
January 1, 2000. Column [3] reports p-values from a test that the means are equal in the two 
subsamples.  Costs data come from Base Case 2006 (v3.0). 
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Table 13: Divestiture and Price Deregulation on Nuclear FOM Costs (2004 $/kW-yr) 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Panel A: Divestiture Only [Eq. (3)] 
1[DIV_ever]i 27.3*** 23.7*** 30.9*** 25.0*** 25.2*** 25.2*** 
  (std.dev.) (5.7) (5.4) (6.3) (5.7) (6.0) (8.7) 
R
2
 0.19 0.35 0.33 0.41 0.61 0.61 
Panel B: Price Deregulation [Eq. (4)] 
1[DIV_ever]i 21.3*** 19.3*** 27.2*** 23.5*** 29.3*** 29.3** 
  (std.dev.) (6.5) (6.3) (7.6) (6.7) (7.3) (9.7) 
  
 
    1[EWG_ever]i 15.1* 10.4 8.0 3.8 -8.4 -8.4 
  (std.dev.) (8.4) (7.8) (9.0) (8.3) (8.5) (10.0) 
R
2
 0.21 0.37 0.34 0.41 0.61 0.61 
Panel C: Control & Clustering 
Reactor age (cubic)  No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Location (Census 
  Division) 
No No Yes No Yes Yes 
Other Time-Invariant 
Characteristics 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering No No No No No Plant 
Observations 103 103 103 103 103 103 
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates and standard errors from 12 separate regressions 
(6 in both Panels A and B, respectively). Other time-invariant characteristics include following 
as categorical variables: number of units per plant, reactor type, containment type, and reactor 
design company.  
 *** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
   ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
     * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 14: Divestiture and Price Deregulation on Nuclear VOM Costs (2004 mills/kWh) 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Panel A: Divestiture Only [Eq. (3)] 
1[DIV_ever]i 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
  (std.dev.) (0.4) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5) 
R
2
 0.14 0.27 0.38 0.34 0.59 0.59 
Panel B: Price Deregulation [Eq. (4)] 
1[DIV_ever]i 0.10** 0.09** 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.19*** 0.09*** 
  (std.dev.) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
  
 
    1[EWG_ever]i 0.12** 0.09* 0.04 0.04 -0.07 -0.07 
  (std.dev.) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
R
2
 0.18 0.29 0.39 0.35 0.60 0.60 
Panel C: Control & Clustering 
Reactor age (cubic)  No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Location (Census 
  Division) 
No No Yes No Yes Yes 
Other Time-Invariant 
Characteristics 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering No No No No No Plant 
Observations 103 103 103 103 103 103 
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates and standard errors from 12 separate regressions 
(6 in both Panels A and B, respectively). Other time-invariant characteristics include following 
as categorical variables: number of units per plant, reactor type, containment type, and reactor 
design company.  
 *** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
   ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
     * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Figure 1: Count of Divested (DIV) and Exempt Wholesale Generators (EWG) by Year for 
U.S. NGUs 
 
Note: 103 nuclear reactors in the sample each year. 
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Figure 2: The Effect of Divestitures (DIV) versus Price Deregulation (EWG) on Operating 
Performance by Month of Year for U.S. NGUs 
 
Notes: The errors bars are 95% confidence intervals.  
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Figure 3: Model Diagram 
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Figure 4: Sample of Raw NRC Power Reactor Status Reports from November 1, 2008 
 
(Source: Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Downloaded December 2010) 
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Figure 5: Daily U.S. NGU Power Levels (1999-2008) 
 
Source: Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Power Reactor Status Reports [with author’s 
calculation]. 
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Figure 6: U.S. Nuclear Fixed Operation and Maintenance (FOM) Costs vs. Variable 
Operation and Maintenance (VOM) Costs VOM by Reactor (in 2004 dollars) 
 
Source: U.S EPA (2006) 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Multiple Pollutants, Unregulated Sectors, and Suboptimal  
Environmental Policies 
(with Don Fullerton) 
 
In a simple model with multiple pollutants from a single source, the first-best can be achieved 
either by a tax on each pollutant or equivalent permit price that reflects the marginal 
environmental damage of each pollutant.  That is, the first-best requires each pollutant to be 
optimally regulated.  Not all pollutants are regulated, however, and even regulated pollutants are 
likely subject to sub-optimally policy.  The multiple pollutant setting creates a complication for 
regulators wanting to adjust policy:  tightening regulation on one pollutant changes how polluters 
value other pollutants.  As a result, a regulator concerned with social-welfare who has the ability 
to change policy only for one pollutant needs to account for changes across multiple pollutants.  
For example, when considering a potential carbon tax or permit policy, it is unlikely that 
regulators will go back and change regulations on other type of air pollution.  This problem may 
occur where different laws and jurisdictions govern the different pollutants, even from a single 
source.
1
 
Coal-fired power plants provide a good example of the multiple pollutant problem.  
While power plants emit many types of pollution, we focus on two important ones: sulfur 
dioxide (SO2) and carbon dioxide (CO2).  In the United States, a permit policy limits sulfur 
dioxide from coal-fired power plants under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Acid 
Rain Program (ARP), which has received much academic attention.
2
  However, those power 
plants also emit carbon dioxide, a pollutant not yet regulated in the U.S.  If CO2 were to be 
regulated via a carbon tax, then we expect a reduction in carbon emissions, but  SO2  permit 
                                                             
1
 In fact, studies of a particular environmental regulation sometimes include “ancillary” benefits from the reduction 
of other pollutants.  See Burtraw et al. (2003) and Groosman et al. (2011).  
2 See Schmalensee et al. (1998), Burtraw et al. (1998), and Carlson et al. (2000).  At present, the cap on sulfur 
emissions due to the ARP is not binding and thus the permit price is currently zero (starting in 2011).  The purpose 
of this paper is to explore the interaction between tax and polices, not to predict actual outcomes, so we use 
historical from 2007 data in our numerical exercise.   
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prices may rise or fall depending on whether carbon and sulfur are substitutes or complements in 
production.
3
         
The existing literature sometimes aggregates pollution into a single variable.  Such 
models do not capture the general case where pollutants have different damages, and thus do not 
necessarily apply within a single medium such as air pollution, but especially across different 
media (air, water, and land pollution).  In this chapter, we address four issues.  First, we model 
analytically the general case where two pollutants can be complements or substitutes in 
production.
4
 
Second, not all pollutants are necessarily controlled by the same type of environmental 
policy.  Indeed, one pollutant might be subject to a tax, while another is limited under a permit 
system.  Therefore, we use a framework that can analyze multiple combinations of tax and 
permit policies.  We show how doing so allows for a relatively easy comparison of policy 
scenarios available to regulators.   
Third, environmental policies are likely to be sub-optimal, where the marginal price per 
unit of pollution does not equal the marginal environmental damage.  In a multiple pollutant 
setting, each policy regulating each pollutant is unlikely to be optimal for at least three reasons: 
technical limitations and informational constraints may preclude correct estimation of social 
costs and benefits; political concerns may prevent the adoption of a first-best policy; and, a 
pollution tax or price likely reflects conditions at the time of enactment rather than present or 
future conditions.  Furthermore, multiple pollutants from a single source are not necessarily all 
regulated by a single regulator using a comprehensive approach.  Thus, we address situations 
where a regulator must choose a policy given existing regulations on other pollutants.
5
 
                                                             
3 In our numerical exercise, we use an implicit U.S EPA assumption that SO2 and CO2 are complements in the U.S. 
electric power sector.  In contrast, anecdotal evidence suggests that air pollution and water pollution are substitutes 
for coal-fired power plants (see Duhigg (2009)).  To be clear, the model we build and our analysis of the multiple 
pollutants problem does not rely on any institution details or structure of the electric power sector, generally, or 
coal-fired power plants, specifically.  Rather, we build a general model and use coal-fired power plants as a relevant 
and clear application.   
 
4 Other models with two pollutants include those of Holland (2012b) and Ren et al. (2011).  
5 Ambec and Coria (2013) provide a recent theoretical contribution that simultaneously analyzes a mix of tax and 
permit policies with a Weitzman-style “prices vs. quantities” approach, in the case with a technological externality 
for abatement effort.  The sign of their key technology parameter determines whether the pollutants are substitutes 
or complements.  Our paper differs by using a general equilibrium approach with perfect certainty and we do not 
solve for either first- or second-best results.  Ambec and Coria (2013) rank the welfare outcomes of policy mixes, 
while we focus on the general equilibrium effects  for a wide range of policy choices and settings. 
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Finally, a pollution tax or permit system is unlikely to cover all sectors of the economy.  
Any carbon policy such as a tax or cap-and-trade system may cover more than just power plants, 
but it will be unlikely to cover all carbon emissions from all industrial, commercial, 
transportation, and residential sources.  Existing estimates suggest that carbon policy can apply 
at most to approximately 80 percent of U.S. carbon emissions [Metcalf and Weisbach (2009)].  If 
so, then a rise in the carbon price or tax may have multiple second-best effects, as carbon 
emissions shift to uncovered sectors (i.e. carbon leakage).
6
   
Our analytical general equilibrium model has two sectors and two pollutants, where 
initial policy is suboptimal.  Both sectors are competitive, with constant returns to scale 
production functions that employ a single clean input.  We refer to the clean input as labor, but it 
could represent labor, capital, or a composite of all clean inputs.  The model employs standard 
assumptions that include perfect information, factor mobility, and certainty.  Where we depart 
from standard modeling is that one regulated sector emits two types of pollutants.  For 
concreteness, our primary example is electricity generation that uses one clean input (labor or 
capital) while generating both SO2 and CO2. With three inputs to production in the regulated 
sector, the elasticities of substitution between inputs become key model parameters.  In addition, 
we assume that the other, unregulated sector employs two inputs, labor and carbon, where these 
carbon emissions are not taxed or subjected to permit requirements.  Log-linearization allows us 
to evaluate policy changes not at the optimum [e.g. Harberger (1962) or Fullerton and Metcalf 
(2001)]. 
Each of the two pollutants could be subject to a tax or permit, so we analyze four 
potential policy combinations.  We solve explicitly for the tax-tax and tax-permit scenarios, but 
the model is symmetric so the tax-permit and permit-permit scenarios are analogous.  Our 
example for the tax-permit scenario is a tax on carbon with a permit policy on sulfur.  In both 
scenarios, we hold the sulfur policy constant and solve for the effects of a small increase in the 
carbon tax.  For both scenarios, we find analytical closed-form solutions and interpret them, and 
we decompose the closed-form solutions into output and substitution effects.   
The tax-tax scenario provides important baseline results.  Our simple closed-form 
solutions characterize the conditions that guarantee particular outcomes (although perverse signs 
                                                             
6 Baylis et al. (2014) analyze and discuss the carbon leakage issue in greater detail.  In addition, Holland (2012a) 
provides a recent, analytical model of carbon leakage. 
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on endogenous variables can occur with extreme parameter values).  For instance, knowing the 
sign of the elasticity of substitution between the clean labor input and the regulated carbon input 
determines the sign of the regulated sector’s output change: if labor and carbon are substitutes, 
then output falls (when the carbon tax increases holding the sulfur tax constant).  Also, the case 
where the pollutants are complements guarantees that output falls.  Finally, the decomposition 
into output and substitution effects yields clear, intuitive results.   
The tax-permit scenario yields more complicated results compared to the tax-tax 
scenario, since the regulated sector essentially has a fixed factor of production.  Specifically, the 
closed-form solutions in this scenario have a denominator with an ambiguous sign, unlike those 
in the tax-tax scenario.  However, we show how to use the tax-tax scenario solutions to interpret 
both the numerator and denominator of the tax-permit scenario solutions. 
The results from the tax-tax and tax-permit scenarios highlight two important ways that 
environmental tax and permits differ in a model with perfect certainty, but with initially sub-
optimal policies in a multiple pollutant setting.
7
  First, given a fixed tax increase on one 
pollutant, whether the other pollutant is subject to either a tax or permit policy affects the 
quantity change of first pollutant that is subject to the tax change.  For example, a 10 percent 
increase in a carbon tax results in a change in carbon emissions at a coal-fired power plant that 
depends on whether SO2 is regulated by a tax or by a permit policy.  Second, if SO2 were subject 
to a tax, then its quantity can increase or decrease, impacting overall welfare gains from a carbon 
tax increase itself.  However, when the second pollutant is subject to a permit policy and that 
policy binds, then welfare does not change via spillover effects. 
Our numerical exercise using historical data from 2007 helps demonstrate the two ways 
that taxes and permits differ in this chapter.  In the tax-tax scenario, a 10 percent increase in a 
carbon tax is found to decrease CO2 emissions by 4.6 percent, and to decrease SO2 by 0.9 
percent.  However, the same 10 percent carbon tax increase in the tax-permit scenario results in a 
smaller decrease in CO2 emissions and zero change in the quantity of SO2 (by definition).  These 
differences in outcomes, despite the same tax increase in both scenarios, means that the welfare 
gains in the tax-tax scenario are more than twice the gains in the tax-permit scenario.      
                                                             
7 We do not consider the Weitzman (1974) case where a carbon tax differs from carbon permits due to uncertainty, 
and we do not solve for first-best or second-best policies.   
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The chapter proceeds as follows.  Section 1 presents the basic model, and section 2 
outlines our welfare analysis in a multiple pollutant setting.  Section 3 provides closed-form, 
analytical solutions for changes in the endogenous variables, given exogenous changes in 
exogenous policy.  Section 4 identifies plausible parameter values to calibrate the model.  
Section 5 presents numerical results using those parameter values, and it conducts sensitivity 
analysis. Section 6 briefly concludes.  
     
1 Model 
We assume perfect competition, perfect information, many identical agents, lump-sum transfers, 
costless enforcement of policies, perfectly mobile resources, and perfect mixing of pollutants 
(i.e. no non-convexities or “hot-spots”).  We compare only long-run equilibria and do not 
consider adjustment costs. 
 
1.A Initial Setup 
The regulated sector produces output Y  by a constant return to scale (CRTS) production function  
),,( SCLYY YY , where  YL   is a productive resource called labor that could be a composite of 
all non-polluting factors of production (labor, capital, land, and technology).  The representative 
firm pays a market-clearing price (pL) for the composite labor input.  This sector emits both 
carbon  (CY)  and sulfur (S).
8
  In sector Y, carbon and sulfur are regulated pollutants, so the firm 
faces the price  pC  when emitting carbon and  pS  when emitting sulfur.  Each price is a tax rate 
or permit price, depending on the prevailing regulation.  The government returns all revenue 
from taxes or permit sales in the form of a lump-sum transfer to the representative household,  
SpCpR SYC  . 
Good  X  is the other good, produced in the unregulated sector, which emits only carbon  
 XC .  Good X is produced by the CRTS production function  ),( XX CLXX  , where  XL   
denotes the labor used in this sector.
9
  Labor is undifferentiated, so the representative firm in 
                                                             
8 Pollutant  S  could be a generic “smoke” pollutant that accounts for all non-carbon pollution. 
9 As a special case, the production of good  X  could be perfectly clean, emitting no pollution  (CX=0), eliminating 
the leakage component of the model. 
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sector X also pays   pL  for one unit of labor.  Carbon in this sector is not explicitly regulated, but 
we introduce an  cost  (τC)  paid by the firm to emit carbon. Think of  τC  as the cost of  
complying with implicit carbon restrictions, such as a fuel-efficiency standards for vehicles or a 
BTU tax, and it is likely smaller than the explicit price with a tax or permit system. Also, having 
some positive price helps close the model with a finite amount of carbon emissions in this sector.   
The binding resource constraint in this economy is given by  XY LLL  .  Here, a fixed 
total amount of labor is perfectly mobile between sectors  X  and  Y, so leisure does not enter the 
utility function.  In both production sectors of the economy, all inputs are necessary for 
production and exhibit diminishing marginal returns.  These conditions – along with regularity 
conditions on the consumer side of the economy – guarantee an interior solution.   
The representative household supplies labor, gets utility from the consumption of goods  
X  and  Y, and receives disutility from pollutants  C  and  S.  The household has a generic utility 
function denoted  ),;,( SCYXUU  , where the marginal utility from X and Y are positive, but 
from C and S are negative.  Furthermore, the household can choose its level of  X  and  Y, but not  
C  or  S.  We assume that pollutants are separable in utility.  Also,  pX  is the market clearing 
price for good  X, and  pY  is the market clearing price for good  Y.  The household maximization 
problem is: 
YpXpRLptsSCYXU YXLYX ..),;,(max },{ . 
 
1.B Log-Linearization 
Totally differentiate the resource constraint XY LLL   to get: 
 
YYXX LL
ˆˆ0    (1) 
 
where LLXX   is the share of labor in production of good X and  LLYY    is the share of 
labor in production of good Y.  Note that  1 YX  .  We use the “hat” notation throughout 
this chapter to denote a proportional change in any variable   XXX LdLL ˆe.g. . 
 Totally differentiate the production functions to show how final output changes when 
firms adjust input quantities: 
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XXCXXL CLX
ˆˆˆ    (2) 
SCLY YSYYCYYL
ˆˆˆˆ    (3) 
 
where  gi   is the factor share of income for input  i  in the production of good  g  (e.g. 
XpLp XXLXL   ).  Thus,  1 XCXL    and  1 YSYCYL  .  
 The zero profit conditions due to perfect competition are  XCXLX CLpXp    and  
SpCpLpYp SYCYLY  .  Totally differentiate these equations and use the profit maximizing 
first-order conditions: 
 
   XCXCXLXLX CLpXp ˆˆˆˆˆˆ    (4) 
     SpCpLpYp SYSYCYCYLYLY ˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆ   . (5) 
 
Good  X   has only two inputs, so factor use responds to changes in relative input prices via the 
elasticity of substitution,  X .  Differentiating the definition of  X   yields: 
 
 .ˆˆˆˆ CLXXX pLC    (6) 
 
To handle three inputs to  Y, we follow Allen (1938), as in Mieszkowski (1972).
10
  Define  eij  as 
the Allen-elasticity of substitution between input  i  and input  j.  That is,  eij  measures the effect 
on the quantity of i from a change in the price of input j, holding all other input prices constant.  
As shown in section 7, the relative input factor responses in sector  Y  are given by: 
 
      SYSSSLSCYCSCLCLYLSLLLY peepeepeeSL ˆˆˆˆˆ    (7) 
      SYSSSCSCYCSCCCLYLSLCLY peepeepeeSC ˆˆˆˆˆ   . (8) 
 
                                                             
10 Fullerton and Heutel (2007) similarly model relationships among labor, capital, and a single pollutant. 
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If  eij  is positive, then the inputs are substitutes; if it is negative, then the inputs are 
complements.  Each input is a complement to itself ( 0iie   for all  i).  The Allen-elasticities are 
symmetric,  jiij ee  , and at most one of the three cross-price elasticities can be negative.
11
 
 Finally, since pollution is separable in utility, we use  U   for the elasticity of 
substitution in utility between  X  and  Y.  Differentiation yields changes in demand behavior 
from a shift in output prices: 
 
 XYU PPYX ˆˆˆˆ   . (9) 
 
These nine linear equation are solved below for the equilibrium impacts of a small change in the 
regulated price of carbon, Cpˆ . 
 
2 Welfare Changes 
Regulators in a multiple pollutant setting have an additional concern:  changing regulation on 
one pollutant has general equilibrium effects that can change the quantity of other pollutants.  In 
fact, tightening regulation on one pollutant may increase pollution in unregulated sectors and 
increase emissions of the other pollutant, both results that decrease welfare (due to initially sub-
optimal regulation).  
Define  C   as the marginal environmental damage (MED) from a unit of carbon, and define  
S   as the MED from a unit of sulfur.  In other words,     CUC  , and  
   SUS  , where     is the marginal utility of income.  In general, the welfare change 
– derived in section 8 – is given by: 
 
      .ˆˆˆ S
I
S
pC
I
C
pC
I
C
I
dU
SSY
Y
CCX
X
CC 

   
 
                                                             
11 A profit maximizing firm conforms to  0 iSiCiL aaa , where  aij  is the partial elasticity of substitution in 
production (related to the Allen-elasticity of substitution by  ijYij eja  ). 
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The left-hand side is the dollar value of the change in utility   dU , divided by national 
income (I).  Thus, it represents the percentage change in welfare (as in Bovenberg and de Mooij 
(1994) or Fullerton and Metcalf (2001)).   
Consider the case where carbon is initially under-priced relative to its MED (i.e. CCp  ).  
Suppose both pollutants in the regulated sector are subject to environmental taxes, and we 
increase the carbon tax while holding the sulfur tax constant.  If  0ˆ Cp   causes emissions to 
fall   0ˆ YC , it increases welfare through the second-term in the welfare equation.  Yet the tax 
on carbon may have negative effects on welfare through either of the other two terms, because 
the regulated sector may increase its use of sulfur   0ˆ S , and the unregulated sector may 
increase its use of carbon   0ˆ XC , assuming   0 CC  .  Thus, the welfare effect is 
generally ambiguous. 
Next, consider the case where carbon is subject to a tax increase, but sulfur is controlled by a 
permit policy so that 0ˆ S  (where we assume the sulfur permit policy binds).  Thus, only 
carbon leakage to the unregulated sector can offset welfare gains from reductions in carbon from 
the regulated sector.  If the regulated carbon price is “near” the MED, then the welfare gain from  
0ˆ YC   can easily be offset by the welfare loss from leakage  0ˆ XC .  Again, to evaluate final 
welfare changes would require parameter values inserted into the closed-form solutions derived 
in the next section. 
 
3 Analytical Solutions of a Change in Carbon Policy 
Equations (1) – (9) are the linear system for general equilibrium effects of a small policy change.  
We define  L  as numeraire, so  0ˆ Lp , and we hold carbon tax in sector X constant relative to 
the clean input as regulatory change is not affecting this sector ( 0ˆ C ).Thus, equation (6) 
simplifies to  XX LC
ˆˆ  .  Next, simplify equation (4) and compare it to equation (2) to show that  
0ˆ Xp .  Good  X  acts as an equivalent numeraire, because both of its inputs have constant 
prices.  Equation (4) becomes redundant to equation (2), leaving 8 equations. 
The pollutants carbon and sulfur are regulated in sector Y, and either can be subject to an 
environmental tax or permit policy.  We focus on changes in carbon policy, holding the existing 
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tax or permit policy on sulfur constant.   For example, in a tax-tax scenario, the carbon tax 
exogenously increases   0ˆ Cp , while sulfur tax remains constant   0ˆ Sp , leaving the carbon 
quantity   YCˆ   and sulfur quantity   Sˆ   to vary endogenously.  In contrast, a tax-permit scenario 
means that the carbon tax exogenously increases   0ˆ Cp , but the sulfur quantity remains 
unchanged   0ˆ S , allowing the carbon quantity   YCˆ   and sulfur price   Spˆ   to adjust 
endogenously.  That is, among the four potential policy variables in the set   SpCp SYC ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ , two 
will be specified as exogenous policy changes, while the other two remain endogenous.    The 
other six unknown variables are    YYXX pLYCLX ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ , so each policy scenario yields a linear 
system with eight equations and eight unknowns.   
Table 15 categorizes four possible scenarios, given two pollutants and two policy regimes 
for each pollutant (tax or permit).  However, we explicitly solve and analyze only two of the four 
scenarios: the tax-tax and tax-permit cases.  The remaining two scenarios (permit-tax and permit-
permit) are implicitly solved by the tax-tax and tax-permit scenarios, respectively, due to the 
model’s symmetry.  Thus, for the first column of Table 15 with a sulfur tax, the carbon tax (tax-
tax case) is functionally equivalent to the box below it with a carbon permit system (permit-tax 
case).
12
  Similarly, for the second column with a sulfur permit system, the effects of a carbon tax 
(tax-permit) are functionally equivalent to the effects of a carbon permit (permit-permit).  This 
symmetry highlights the fact that the type of pollution control on sulfur fundamentally 
determines how the regulated sector reacts to tightening restriction on carbon, regardless of 
whether the carbon restriction comes in the form of a tax or permit policy.
13
   
 
3.A Tax-Tax Scenario 
The exogenous change in the tax-tax scenario is  0ˆ Cp   (with 0ˆ Sp ).  The change in the 
price of good  Y  is  CYCY pp ˆˆ   (by substituting equation (3) into (5) and cancelling terms), so 
                                                             
12 Given a sulfur tax, the case with 1% higher carbon tax that leads to a 2% change in carbon is equivalent to the 
case with a 2% change in carbon permits (which leads to a 1% increase in price). 
13 Alternatively, the other pollutant could be under an environmental mandate.  Fullerton and Heutel (2010) 
investigate the impact of mandates in a model with labor, capital, and a single pollutant.  Specifically, the look at 
emission per unit of output (i.e. “performance standards”) or input (i.e. “technology mandates”), and find that 
incidence results depend on elasticity parameters (as in our model).  
64 
 
increasing the carbon tax always raises the price of  Y  relative to the price of  X  (since  0ˆ Xp ).  
Further algebra reveals the change in output of good  Y  (given the sulfur tax,  Sp ): 
 
  CYCUSCSCCCX
S
pee
p
Y ˆˆ    (10) 
 
where 0






YL
YC
X
Y
C




   and  0






YL
YS
X
Y
S




 .  We interpret the three terms in the 
brackets in equation (10) when  0ˆ Cp .  First, 0U  means that consumers shift away from 
good  Y  to good  X  when the carbon tax increases the price Y.  Second,  0CCCe   reflects an 
own-price effect on carbon use from an increase in carbon price.  All inputs have a positive 
marginal product, so less carbon means less output of  Y.   Third, suppose the two pollutants are 
complements   0SCSe , so the higher price of carbon reduces sulfur.  Less input reduces 
output of  Y.  This term has the opposite sign when the two pollutants are substitutes.  Therefore,  
Y  unambiguously falls when the two pollutants are complements, but the change in  Y  is 
ambiguous when the pollutants are substitutes.   
Alternatively, equation (10) can be rewritten as: 
 
  CYCLCYUX
S
pe
p
Y ˆˆ   .
 
(10') 
 
This equation shows that when carbon and labor are substitutes   0LCe , then  Y   must fall.  
This  0LCe   does not imply  0SCe , but  0SCe   does imply  0LCe  (since the properties of 
Allen-elasticities guarantee  SCYSCCYCLCYL eee  0   and  0CCe ).  Therefore, to guarantee  
0ˆ Y , carbon and labor being substitutes is a more general condition than the pollutants being 
complements.  Also, it might be easier to determine empirically whether carbon and labor are 
substitutes, since labor is often a well measured input.  Finally, we explicitly show those two 
forms of  Yˆ   because equation (10) highlights the cross-pollutant elasticity  SCe , while equation 
(10') provides a more compact closed-form solution with fewer parameters. 
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Next, we solve for the change in the regulated sector’s carbon emissions:14 
 
   CYCCCLCYUX
S
Y pee
p
C ˆˆ
Effect
onSubstituti
Effect
Output












  
. (11) 
 
The first term is called the output effect because it equals  Yˆ   from equation (10').  Its sign is 
generally ambiguous.  The substitution effect   CCe   in equation (11) is always negative, 
because  0CCe , but the overall change in  YCˆ   is generally ambiguous.  If the pollutants are 
complements   0SCe , however, then equation (10) shows that  Yˆ   is negative, the output 
effect is negative, and carbon emissions fall.  Still, a strong substitution effect can overcome a 
positive output effect and lead to a fall in carbon.
15
 
 Next, we report solutions for the changes in the other inputs in sector  Y.  The changes in 
sulfur  (S)  and labor  (LY) are given by: 
 
   CCYCSCLCYUX
S
pApee
p
S ˆˆˆ  
 
(12) 
   CYCLCLCYUX
S
Y pee
p
L ˆˆ   .
 
(13) 
 
 
                                                             
14 Equation (11) can be inverted to yield the solution to the permit-tax scenario (where carbon is subject to a permit 
policy and sulfur is subject to a tax): 
  

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
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





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CCLCYUXS
C
C
eep
p

ˆ1
ˆ . 
15 A positive output effect occurs under the conditions  0LCe   (i.e. carbon and labor are complements) and  
UXLCY e   , but the change in carbon is still negative if  LCYUXCC ee   .  In our numerical 
example below,  X   is much larger than  Y   so a positive output effect does not occur.  Intuitively, since the 
price of good Y always increases in this scenario, a positive output effect must coincide with a fall in real income 
due to the tax increase. 
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Equations (12) and (13) have forms similar to (11), where each equation also can be decomposed 
into output and substitution effects.  (The notation  CpAˆ   in (12) is used below.)  Whereas the 
substitution effect in equation (11) has an unambiguous sign, because   0CCe , the substitution 
effects in equation (12) and (13) have ambiguous signs (since  SCe   and  LCe   have ambiguous 
signs).  For instance, if the two pollutants are substitutes   0SCe , then the carbon tax has a 
positive substitution effect on sulfur.  Since the output effect already has an ambiguous sign, then 
changes in sulfur and labor are generally ambiguous.  Only one of the three cross-price Allen-
elasticities can be negative, however, so both parameters  SCe   and  LCe   cannot simultaneously 
have negative signs.  Thus, one of the substitution effects is positive.  Furthermore, using 
equation (10'), we can rewrite equation (13) as: 
 
  CYCLCUX
S
Y pe
p
L ˆˆ   .
 
(13') 
 
Therefore,  LCU e   guarantees  0
ˆ YL .  Since  0U , equation (13') says that the labor 
input in the regulated sector must fall, unless labor and carbon are more substitutable in 
production than the two goods are substitutable in utility.  
Finally, we look at carbon leakage, defined as the change in pollution in the other sector, 
building on Baylis et al. (2014).  They have a simpler model, with carbon as the only pollutant, 
and they show that  YLˆ   effectively determines the amount of carbon leakage in sector  X.  The 
constant private resource cost of carbon, with labor as numeraire  0ˆˆ  LC pr , means that 
relative input prices in sector  X  do not change, and firms therefore choose to adjust carbon and 
labor inputs equally, XX LC
ˆˆ     (despite the fact that the firm could choose to substitute between 
inputs, see equation 6).  With CRTS, proportional changes in both inputs means the same 
proportional change in output   XX LCX ˆˆˆ  .  Therefore, carbon leakage is given by: 
 
    CYCLCUYYXY
S
X
S
X peL
p
L
p
C ˆˆˆˆ    (14) 
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with a sign always the opposite to that of the change in labor in  Y.   
In summary, these closed-form solutions highlight how the signs of endogenous 
outcomes are determined by cross-price elasticities that need to be estimated.  We show how 
increasing the carbon tax necessarily decreases carbon emissions in sector  Y  when the 
pollutants are complements, but results are generally ambiguous when the two pollutants are 
substitutes.  Using the alternative solutions that eliminate the cross-pollutant elasticity  SCe , we 
show that output in the regulated sector always falls when carbon and labor are substitutes.  The 
amount of labor used in the regulated sector falls, unless labor and capital are more substitutable 
in production than the goods are substitutable in consumption. 
 
3.B Tax-Permit Scenario 
If a tax is levied on carbon while sulfur is subject to a permit policy, then  0ˆ Cp   
and   0ˆ S .  
Here, the quantity of sulfur is fixed, so changes in the carbon tax do not affect sulfur emissions.  
Unlike the tax-tax scenario, the price change in sector  Y  can have an ambiguous sign and is 
recursively given by  CYCSYSY ppp ˆˆˆ   , where  Spˆ   is now endogenous.  Also, unlike the tax-
tax scenario, the price changes in the tax-permit scenario include a denominator (D).  To define 
this term D, we first digress to look briefly at an alternate tax-tax case with a change only in the 
sulfur tax: 
  
   SSYSSSLSYUX
C
pDpee
p
S ˆˆˆ   . (15) 
 
This equation merely switches the roles of  C  and  S  in equation (11) above (instead of finding 
the effect on carbon from a change in carbon tax, it show the effect on sulfur from a change in 
the sulfur tax).  The reason for that digression is that we can use it to show the effect on sulfur 
price from a change in carbon tax:  
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(16) 
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where A is the coefficient from equation (12) in the tax-tax scenario.   
The change in sulfur permit price has an ambiguous sign, and equation (16) initially 
appears complicated relative to solutions in the tax-tax scenario, because it contains four 
different Allen-elasticites and a denominator.  While  D  is not necessarily negative, a strong 
enough substitution effect in equation (15) would mean that an increase in the sulfur tax 
decreases the sulfur quantity in the alternate tax-tax scenario.  Closed-form solutions for the 
other endogenous variables in the tax-permit scenario have the same denominator as equation 
(16), so for purposes of discussion we focus on the “normal” case where  SSe   is large enough to 
ensure that  D  is negative.   
In the numerator (A) of the tax-permit scenario in (16), suppose carbon and sulfur are 
complements (where  0SCe   implies that  0LCe   and  0LSe ).  Intuitively, when the 
pollutants are complements, an increase in the carbon price reduces the demand for sulfur and 
thus the sulfur price.  Furthermore, neither  0LCe   nor  0LSe   guarantees  0ˆ Sp , so the sign 
of the cross-price elasticity between pollutants provides greater information on the sign of 
endogenous variables than does the sign of the cross-price elasticity between labor and either 
pollutant (where the opposite is true in the tax-tax scenario).             
Next, solving for the closed-form solution of  Ypˆ   yields: 
 
C
YSYC
Y p
D
AD
S
p ˆˆ
 

 
(17) 
 
where the denominator is the same as in equation (16), and the sign is generally ambiguous.  The 
output price may fall despite an increase in the cost of an input.  A large enough substitution 
effect in  D leads to    0 AD YSYC  , however, meaning the price of good Y  increases (since 
we assume the denominator is negative).   
 Recursively, the change in output is  YYCYYL CLY
ˆˆˆ   , which is simply the weighted-
sum of the changes in the two inputs (since the tax-permit scenario fixes the quantity of sulfur).  
Solving for the closed-form solution yields:   
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C
YSSSYCSC p
D
AeDe
S
Y ˆˆ
 
  (18) 
 
where equation (18) looks similar to equation (17), but elasticities enter each numerator term to 
switch from a price solution to a quantity solution.  Also, equation (18) has a negative sign, 
unlike equation (17), because price and quantity generally move in opposite directions.      
 Next, insert  0ˆ S   into (3) and solve for   YYL
YC
Y LYC
ˆˆ1ˆ 

 , an expression that 
decomposes the change in carbon into output and substitution effects.  Here, the substitution 
effect is just the scaled change in the clean labor input, due to the fixed sulfur content.  The 
closed-form solution is: 
 
   
C
YSCSSSYCCCSC
Y p
D
AeeDee
S
C ˆˆ
 
 . (19) 
 
This equation is similar to equation (18), but it has two more elasticity parameters in the 
numerator.  Again, we might expect the quantity of carbon to fall when the carbon tax increases, 
but equation (19) has a generally ambiguous sign.  However, the two pairs of elasticity 
parameters in the numerator can help explain the ambiguity.  For instance, the pair   CCSC ee    
measures the relative changes in sulfur and carbon given a carbon price change.  The most 
plausible parameter values suggest that the own-price effect is larger than cross-price effects.  
Thus, since  0CCe , and assuming that  SCCC ee  , then    0 CCSC ee  means the first term in 
the numerator is negative (reducing carbon in sector  Y).  Similarly, the pair   CSSS ee    
measures the relative changes in sulfur and carbon given the sulfur price change from equation 
(16) and recalling the symmetry of Allen-elasticities   CSSC ee  .     
Finally, comparing equation (11) to equation (19) shows that whether sulfur is subject to 
a tax or permit policy clearly changes how the carbon tax affects the quantity of carbon 
emissions.  
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Similarly, the change in the clean labor input in the tax-permit scenario can be 
decomposed into the output and substitution effects using equation (3) with  0ˆ S .  The closed-
form solution here is also complicated, given by: 
 
   
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(20) 
 
It has a form like equation (19), but with some of the elasticity parameters switched.  
Specifically,   LCSC ee    measures the relative changes in sulfur and labor given a carbon price 
change, while   LSSS ee    measures the relative change in sulfur and labor given a sulfur price 
change.  Finally, as in the tax-tax scenario, the carbon leakage into sector  X  is given by the 
recursive equation    YXYX LC ˆˆ  . 
 Overall, compared to the tax-tax scenario, we find that the tax-permit scenario has more 
ambiguous outcomes that depend on parameter values, since it has a fixed-factor of production in 
sector Y.  As in the tax-tax scenario, however, we can explicitly decompose the changes in the 
input variables,  YCˆ   and  YLˆ , into output and substitution effects.  In the end, we still highlight 
an intermediate conclusion that the cross-price elasticities need to be estimated. 
   
4 Parameter Values 
This section provides parameter values for a numerical analysis using the solutions above for all 
endogenous variables and overall welfare.  The analytical expressions in section 3 are complex, 
with ambiguous signs in many instances, so this numerical analysis can help determine both 
signs and magnitudes.  For the numerical analysis, we model an electricity generation sector that 
emits both carbon and sulfur dioxide (that is, good Y is the entire U.S. electricity sector and not 
just electricity from coal-fired power plants).  We calibrate the model to emission data and other 
economic data from the year 2007, since recent regulatory changes mean the current price for 
sulfur permits is zero (starting in 2011).  Our numerical example is for expository purposes, and 
thus uses historical data..  The simplified model in this chapter does not capture all possible 
effects of a carbon tax in general equilibrium, such as explicitly modeling the fuel markets.  It is 
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therefore not a “forecast” of actual effects from a carbon tax, but merely an example for the 
analytical results above. 
    
4.A Base-case Levels 
The U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) reports 2007 GDP of $13,808 billion, 
which we use for national income, I [see U.S. BEA (2009)].  The U.S. Energy Information 
Agency (EIA) calculates end-use electricity sales of $344 billion, or 2.5 percent of total 
economic activity (see U.S. EIA, 2009).  Thus, we use $344 billion for  YpY . 
Next, the U.S. EPA’s 2009 Greenhouse Gas Inventory (U.S. EPA, 2009a) reports that 
electric generators emitted 2,397 million metric tons (MMtons) of CO2 (constituting 42 percent 
of all U.S. domestic CO2 combustion emissions in 2007).  While no carbon tax or permit policy 
currently applies to the U.S. electricity market, we impose a hypothetical initial price of $15 per 
metric ton of CO2 as a starting point (Hassett, Mathur, and Metcalf, 2009).  Thus,  YCCp   equals 
$36 billion.  The rest of the economy emitted 3,339 million metric ton of CO2 from fossil fuel 
combustion in 2007.  We use $5 per metric ton of CO2 in sector X, and thus  XCC   
equals $16.7 
billion.
16
  Second, the 2009 National Emissions Inventory (U.S. EPA (2009b)) reports that 
electric generators emitted 8,973 thousand tons of SO2 from fossil fuel combustion in 2007 
(constituting 69.4 percent of all U.S. domestic SO2 emissions).  For the initial  Sp   in our model, 
we use the equilibrium price for emission permits under the U.S. EPA’s Acid Rain Program cap-
and-trade regime, which represents the opportunity cost for each ton of SO2 emissions.  We use 
the average of the 2007 vintage allowance price during the year 2007, or $530 per ton of SO2 
emissions.  Thus,  SpS   equals $4.8 billion.
17
 
Since the production function  ),,( SCLY YY   exhibits constant returns to scale, the clean 
input aggregate resource level   YL   can be identified by subtracting the costs of pollution from 
                                                             
16 The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) is a market where U.S. companies voluntarily buy and sell carbon 
allowances, so the price on this exchange represents an opportunity cost that firms face when emitting a marginal 
ton of CO2.  Even a company that does not trade on the CCX could have cut one ton of emission and thereby earned 
that allowance price.  In 2007, the average daily mid price for 2007 vintage allowances was $3.18 per metric ton. 
We round-up to our unregulated carbon cost to $5 per metric ton. 
17 Generating units smaller than 25 MW are exempt from the cap, but the vast majority of emissions are covered.  
The permit price data are reported by Evolution Markets and retrieved via Bloomberg data terminal.   
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sales revenue.  With the normalization that 1Lp , the zero profit condition uniquely determines  
YL .  Since the electricity sector has $40.8 billion in emission costs, then the remainder of $303 
billion must be paid to the non-polluting input.  A similar calculation is conducted for the rest of 
the economy to determine  XL .  Table 16 records all of the base-case levels. 
Next, these levels are converted into the share parameter values used in the log-linearized 
equations (1)-(9), and hence in the closed-form solutions.  For example, Table 17 panel A shows 
that the U.S. electricity sector uses 2.2% of the total clean inputs in the economy   022.0Y , 
and those clean inputs account for 88.2% of the inputs in sector Y   882.0YC . 
 
4.B Allen-Elasticities 
Equations (7) and (8) contain nine Allen-elasticities that determine input factor responses in the 
regulated sector.  However, the Allen-elasticities are symmetric   jiij ee  .  In addition, knowing 
just the cross-price Allen-elasticities   jieij for   and share parameters uniquely determines the 
own-price Allen-elasticities (see section 7).  Thus, we focus on identifying the cross-price Allen-
elasticities   LSLCSC eee ,, , and we use them to determine the own-price Allen-elasticities 
 SSCCLL eee ,, .  All these parameters are best interpreted as long-run elasticities. 
 A key question in our analysis is whether the two pollutants are substitutes or 
complements, but to our knowledge  SCe   has never been estimated.  As section 9 explains, we 
use the U.S. EPA’s analysis of proposed carbon cap-and-trade legislation to determine our base-
case value of  SCe , and we find a value of -0.6 (meaning that carbon and sulfur are complements 
under EPA assumptions).  Also, we round the -0.47 estimate of Considine and Larson (2006) for 
the labor and sulfur elasticity to  5.0LSe ,  and we assume that same elasticity for the labor and 
carbon elasticity   LCe .  The remaining own-price elasticities are derived from those.  Table 17 
panel B reports all base-case Allen-elasticity values. 
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4.C Other Parameters 
Table 17 panel C reports the final three parameters needed for our numerical analysis.  First, for 
the elasticity of substitution in utility   U , we use 0.25, which is the value the U.S. EPA uses in 
their computational general equilibrium model as their household substitution parameter between 
energy and all other goods [RTI (2008)].  Tol (2009) surveys the literature and finds the average 
estimate for the MED of carbon dioxide   C   equal to $39 per metric ton.  Muller and 
Mendelsohn (2009) calculate the average MED of sulfur dioxide   S   to be $1,510 per ton.
18
 
 
5 Numerical Results 
5.A Base-case 
The base-case numerical results appear in Table 18.  Column (1) reports results for the tax-tax 
policy scenario, where the carbon tax increases by 10 percent, and the sulfur dioxide tax remains 
constant (so  Cpˆ   is 0.10 and  Spˆ   is zero by assumption, where those entries are shaded grey).  
As a result of this policy change with base-case parameters, regulated CO2 emissions fall by 4.6 
percent, and SO2 emissions fall by almost one percent.  The complementarity between pollutants  
 6.0SCe   leads to the decline in sulfur dioxide (-0.90) as the carbon price increases.   
Producers increase their use of the clean input, a result expected from the substitutability 
between carbon and the clean input  5.0LCe .  Next, the price of good  Y  increases by slightly 
more than one percent, and output of good  Y  falls by 0.27 percent.   
Since production of good  X  occurs with an unchanged ratio of inputs, the increase in  
YLˆ   means that both  XLˆ   and  XCˆ   must fall.  Thus, the tax on CO2 emissions in sector Y 
decreases carbon pollution in both sectors.  Leakage is slightly negative with base-case 
parameters.
19
  Carbon pollution can fall in both sectors because carbon is not subject to a binding 
                                                             
18 Tol (2009) reports that the social cost of carbon is $105 per metric ton of carbon in 1995 dollars, a value we 
convert to a carbon dioxide equivalent and inflate to 2007 dollars using the All Items CPI (Series ID# 
CUSR0000SA0).  Muller and Mendelsohn (2009) report their sulfur dioxide MED estimate in 2002 dollars, and we 
inflate their estimate to 2007 using the same CPI series. 
19 Intuition for the negative leakage result in Baylis et al. (2014) is simple: a carbon tax can induce firms to use more 
clean inputs per unit of output, and thus draw resources away from the other sector, which reduces the other sector’s 
output and emissions.  The same mechanism operates in this model. 
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constraint; decreasing its use in one sector does not necessitate increasing its use in the other 
sector.  As a result of the policy change, overall welfare improves by 0.59 percent, which is a 
utility increase in dollar terms of $8.13 billion per year.  The welfare gain is almost evenly split 
between gains from carbon reduction in the regulated sector (0.287 percent) and sulfur dioxide 
reductions (0.303 percent).  The reduction in carbon emissions of the unregulated sector is small 
and adds little to welfare.  Interesting is the fact that this added carbon tax raises slightly more 
welfare from SO2 reduction than from CO2 reduction.
20
   
However, if both MED’s are really only half of the size measured by Tol (2009) and 
Muller and Mendelsohn (2009), then the welfare gains fall by more than half (see Table 18 panel 
C). For example, halving the MEDs for the tax-tax scenario leads to a welfare gain of 0.123 
percent instead of 0.591 percent.  This occurs despite the general equilibrium model being linear, 
because section 2 shows that welfare changes are: 
 
      .ˆˆˆ S
I
S
pC
I
C
pC
I
C
I
dU
SSY
Y
CCX
X
CC 

   
 
When the MEDs are halved, the differences   CCp    and   SSp    fall by more than half.  
For example, baseline parameters values means   CCp  =24, but halving the carbon MED 
changes that difference to 4.5, a drop of over 81 percent.  Welfare is affected disproportionally 
more by a large difference between social and private cost than by a small difference.   
Table 18 column (2) reports base-case results for the tax-permit scenario while keeping 
the carbon tax increase at 10% and holding fixed the permit policy on sulfur.  Here, the decrease 
in carbon emissions in sector  Y  is only slightly lower than the carbon decrease in the tax-tax 
scenario.  However, the welfare gain is only 0.286 percent – approximately half of the gain in the 
tax-tax scenario – because sulfur is fixed in the tax-permit scenario   0ˆ S .  Meanwhile, the 
sulfur price falls because the two pollutants are complements.  This column numerically shows 
how an environmental tax or permit policy on sulfur clearly changes how the carbon tax affects 
the quantity of carbon emissions.     
                                                             
20 Our analysis does not take into account consumer heterogeneity either through distributional impacts [e.g. 
Fullerton et al. (2012)] or differential damages [e.g. Muller and Mendelsohn (2009)]. 
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Table 18 column (3) matches the change in sector Y’s carbon emission across the two 
policy scenarios.  Here, the tax-permit scenario needs a larger carbon tax increase (10.06%) to 
reach the same 4.59% reduction in carbon emissions as in the tax-tax scenario.
21
  Table 18 
column (4) sets the tax increase in tax-permit scenario to match the welfare gains of the tax-tax 
scenario, and we find that the tax rate increase would need to more than double (20.7% rather 
than 10%). 
Table 19 decomposes the input variables   YY LSC ˆ,ˆ,ˆ   from Table 18 into output and 
substitution effects, using the analytical expressions in section 3.  In column (1), for example, the 
change in carbon in sector Y is -4.59%, with -0.27 percentage points coming from the output 
effect and -4.32 percentage points coming from the substitution effect.  The output effect for 
each cell in Table 19 is just the value of  Yˆ   from the corresponding column in Table 18 (so the 
output effect is constant within each column).  Since the decomposition is linear, the remainder 
must be the substitution effect.    
While the levels of the output and substitution effects are important, we find the ratio of 
the two effects to be quite informative.  First, for  YCˆ , note that the ratio of the substitution effect 
to the output effect is 16.18 in column (1) but rises to 16.62 in columns (2) – (4).  This result is 
expected, given that the fixed sulfur input in the tax-permit scenarios keeps output from falling 
as much as in the tax-tax scenario.  Second, the ratio for  YCˆ   is the same in three columns (2) – 
(4), as expected from the model’s linearity.  Third, the ratio for  YLˆ   is the same across all 
models.  Decomposition of output and substitution effect helps to understand the numerical 
outcomes. 
 Given that the numerical example is based on an actual sulfur permit policy, then one can 
ask:  In an alternate tax-permit policy where the carbon tax is held constant and the sulfur policy 
changes, how much would the permit policy need to tighten in order to match the welfare 
changes from the base-case tax-tax scenario?  To answer, we construct Table 20, which has the 
exact same setup as Table 18, and column (1) in each table is identical.  The differences come in 
columns (2)-(4) where the alternate tax-permit policy results are shown, and these scenarios 
require holding the carbon tax constant   0ˆ Cp  and then changing the sulfur permit quantity to 
                                                             
21 Interestingly, even with a higher tax rate, the tax-permit scenario has a smaller output effect compared to the tax-
tax scenario (-0.26% vs. -0.27%).  It is offset by a larger substitution effect. 
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match given criteria.  Column (2) matches the sulfur quantity change from column (1), and 
shows that since the sulfur quantity does not change dramatically (-0.90) then the carbon 
quantity does not decrease dramatically either (-0.03), although they have the same sign as the 
pollutants are complements.  When we tried to match the carbon change criteria in column (3), 
the results were outside the bounds of the model; specifically, to match 56.4ˆ YC   would 
require reducing the sulfur cap more than 100 percent (recalling our model assumes the cap is 
always binding).  Column (4) matches the base-case total welfare and would require tightening 
the sulfur cap by -1.74 percent.  As was concluded from the results in Table 18, the change in 
sulfur emissions plays an important role in the total welfare change.
22
 
 
5.B Sensitivity 
Whether the two pollutants are substitutes or complements drives many of the empirical results.   
Thus, we conduct a sensitivity analysis by varying the parameter  SCe   from -2 to 2 along the 
horizontal axis in three figures for the tax-tax scenario.  When varying  SCe , we hold the input 
shares and the other cross-price Allen-elasticities constant but let the own-price Allen-elasticities 
adjust (according to the identity  0 ikYkijYjiiYi eee  ).  Each figure also shows three curves, 
one for each of three assumptions about the elasticity of substitution in utility.  One curve 
represents the base-case assumption of  25.0U , while one curve has no output effect  
 0U , and the other has a larger output effect   1U .   
Figure 7 shows the change in regulated carbon dioxide for a 10 percent increase in the 
carbon tax, while the sulfur tax remains constant (the tax-tax scenario).  From equation (11), we 
know that the substitution effect   CCe   strongly influences this outcome, and thus we observe 
only small variations in the carbon quantity change for different values of  SCe   or  U .  The 
value of  YCˆ   on the vertical axis only changes by about one percentage point, such as from -
4.0% to -5.0%.  
                                                             
22 Equation (15) gives the closed-form solution to the alternate tax-tax scenario.  Inverting this solution given the 
closed-form change to the sulfur permit price in the alternative tax-permit scenario, and then the remainder of the 
endogenous variables can be determined using recursive substitution. 
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Next, Figure 8 shows that the change in the sulfur dioxide quantity varies greatly across 
different values of  SCe .  In fact, the sign and size of  Sˆ   changes from -3.0% to +2.0% as the 
pollutants become strong substitutes.  The case with the strong output effect   1U   allows 
consumers to shift away from good  Y , which reduces the demand for sulfur.  Lastly, Figure 9 
depicts the welfare changes in dollars, and it shows that welfare can indeed fall as a result of 
tightening carbon policy when the pollutants are highly substitutable.  A strong output effect 
 1U  mitigates that danger to welfare, again because falling output of  Y  reduces input 
demand for sulfur emissions.  Total benefits can be positive or negative, depending on parameter 
values. 
Finally, we observe that the base-case parameterization leads to numerical results that do 
not differ much for some outcomes between the tax-tax and tax-permit scenarios.  In the first two 
columns of Table 18, for example, the output change in sector  Y  is -0.27% in the tax-tax 
scenario and -0.26% in the tax-permit scenario (for a 10% increase in carbon price).  Similarly, 
the change in carbon emissions from sector  Y  is -4.59% in the tax-tax scenario and -4.56% in 
the tax-permit scenario.  These small numerical differences are due to the small input shares for 
sulfur and carbon in sector  Y  (in contrast, the welfare changes for these two scenarios are 
0.591% and 0.286%).      
Table 21 conducts sensitivity analysis on these pollution share parameters.  Column (1) 
repeats the base-case results from Table 18.  Column (2) reports results from a numerical 
example that doubles the sulfur share parameter (from  014.0YS   to  028.0YS , while 
simultaneously adjusting the residual parameters).
23
  Indeed, if  S  is interpreted as “smoke”, to 
encompass all other pollutants besides carbon, then the share might well be double that for sulfur 
alone.  For the tax-tax scenario in panel A,  Yˆ  and  YCˆ  are unaffected, since neither  YS  nor any 
residual parameter appears in equations (10') and (12).  Meanwhile, given the same decrease in 
                                                             
23 We use emissions data to calculate the sulfur and carbon shares, while  YSYCYL  1   identifies the labor 
share.  The literature and U.S. EPA data provide the cross-price Allen-elasticities  SCLCLS eee ,, .  A profit 
maximizing firm conforms to the identity  0 iSiCiL aaa , where  aij  is the partial elasticity of substitution in 
production (related to the Allen-elasticity of substitution by  ijYij eja  ).  Thus, the own-price Allen-elasticities 
 LLCCSS eee ,,  are residuals. For example,   LSYLSCYCYSSS eee   1 .  A consequence is that our small  YS   
implies large  SSe .  Doubling  YS   yields more reasonable  SSe .    
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output, the higher sulfur share means that carbon emissions do not fall as much as in the base-
case.  For the tax-permit scenario in panel B, output and carbon emissions have smaller 
decreases than in the base-case.  The greater sulfur share reduces the input flexibility for sector  
Y, and thus the carbon tax change has less impact.  Overall, Table 21 column (2) shows greater 
differences between the two scenarios when the sulfur share is larger. 
Table 21 column (3) doubles the base-case carbon price and the carbon share.  Intuitively, 
when the share of carbon is larger, the same 10% tax increase leads to greater percentage 
changes in output.  Mechanically,  YC   appears in the numerator of all the closed-form 
expressions.
24
  Finally, Table 21 column (4) doubles both the sulfur and carbon shares.  These 
results combine the greater differences from column (2) with the greater magnitudes in column 
(3) to get numerical results that have larger absolute differences than any of the other three 
columns. 
   
6 Conclusion 
In order to solve analytically for all price and quantity outcomes in general equilibrium, this 
chapter builds a two-sector model of a closed economy using standard assumptions of perfect 
competition, constant returns to scale, mobile factors of production, and perfect certainty.  Yet 
we consider two pollutants in the regulated sector that may be complements or substitutes, where 
either pollutant maybe controlled by a tax or by a permit system.  We find closed-form solutions 
that show general equilibrium outcomes for any parameter values, and we provide intuition for 
our results. 
 The chapter highlights two important ways that environmental taxes and permit policies 
are not equivalent.  First, the quantity change for a pollutant subject to a tax increase depends on 
whether the other pollutant is subject to a tax or permit policy.  Second, if that other pollutant is 
subject to a tax, then general equilibrium effects can increase or decrease its quantity and impact 
overall welfare.  However, when the second pollutant is subject to a permit policy, and that 
policy binds, then welfare does not change via spillover effects.   
                                                             
24 Despite these larger differences between columns (1) and (3), the differences within column (3) between the tax-
tax scenario and the tax-permit scenario are similar to the difference within column (1). 
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The model is general enough that it can be applied to many multiple pollutant problems 
within and across media.  As an example, we conduct a numerical analysis of the U.S. electricity 
sector that emits carbon dioxide and sulfur dioxide from burning coal.  Our most plausible 
parameters reflect the U.S. EPA assumption that CO2 and SO2 are complements across the entire 
sector, and so a tax on CO2 increases welfare by reducing both pollutants within the regulated 
sector.  The numerical exercise helps demonstrate the two ways that environmental taxes and 
permits differ in a general equilibrium model with multiple pollutants and initially sub-optimal 
policies.   
 
7 Factor Demand Responses in Sector Y 
Here, we derive equations (7) and (8), describing the input demand responses to changes in input 
prices.  Define the input demand functions from cost minimization:  
 
 YpppLL SCLYY ,,  
 YpppCC SCLYY ,,  
 YpppSS SCL ,, . 
 
 
 
 
Next, totally differentiate each input demand function.   
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Divide through each equation by  YL ,  YC , and  S, respectively, and rearrange. 
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Constant returns to scale production implies that the input demand functions are homogenous of 
degree one in  Y, so it follows that  1


Y
Y
L
Y
Y
L
,  1


Y
Y
C
Y
Y
C
, and  1


S
Y
Y
S
.  Next, the 
equations can be rewritten using the “hat” notation as: 
 
YpapapaL SLSCLCLLLY
ˆˆˆˆˆ   
YpapapaC SCSCCCLCLY
ˆˆˆˆˆ   
YpapapaS SSSCSCLSL
ˆˆˆˆˆ   
 
 
 
 
where,  ija   is the elasticity of demand for input i with respect to input price j, leaving all the 
other inputs constant (called the partial elasticity of substitution in production).   The conditions 
for profit maximization imply that  0iia ; that is, inputs are self-complementary, and  
0 iSiCiL aaa .  The Allen-elasticity, denoted  ije , is the elasticity of demand for input i with 
respect to input price j, holding all other factor prices constant.  Using the algebraic identity  
ijYjij ea  , we rewrite the equations in terms of Allen-elasticities. 
 
YpepepeL SYSLSCYCLCLYLLLY
ˆˆˆˆˆ    
YpepepeC SYSCSCYCCCLYLCLY
ˆˆˆˆˆ    
YpepepeS SYSSSCYCSCLYLSL
ˆˆˆˆˆ   . 
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Finally, because these equations are not independent, subtract the third from the first and second, 
respectively, to eliminate  Yˆ , and rearrange using the symmetry of the Allen-elasticities  
 jiij ee   to yield equations (7) and (8). 
 
8 Derivation of the Welfare Equation  
To derive equations (26) and (27), totally differentiate the utility function: 
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Substitute in the first-order conditions (FOCs),  
Xp
X
U



  and  
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Y
U
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

  from the household 
maximization problem, where     is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint.  Next, 
totally differentiate the production functions for  X  and  Y  and substitute the resulting  dX   and  
dY   into the equation above to get: 
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Continuing, totally differentiate the resource constraint with  0dL , and use   YX dLdL  : 
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The profit maximizing FOCs in sector  X  are  
L
X
X p
L
X
p 


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X
X
C
X
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

.  Also, the 
FOCs in sector  Y  are  
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Y
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Y
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, and  SY p
S
Y
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

.  Distribute  Xp   and  Yp   
across terms, and substitute the appropriate FOC: 
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Note that the  YLdLp   terms cancel to leave: 
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Next, divide through by   , and substitute the expressions  YX dCdCdC  ,  
   CUC  , and     SUS    into the previous equation to yield:   
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where C  and S are the marginal environmental damages from carbon and sulfur, respectively. 
Next, divide through by total income  I, multiply each term by an appropriate expression 
for one to employ the “hat” notation: 
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to get the equation found in section 2.  
 
9 The Carbon and Sulfur Elasticity 
The EPA’s examination of the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (HR 2454, 
111
th
 Congress) uses many assumptions in a large complicated model to provide a long-run 
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projection of future emission quantities and prices for both CO2 and SO2.  Table 22 reports the 
emission price-quantity pairs from the EPA’s analysis of HR 2454, where panel A is the 
projected business-as-usual scenario, and panel B makes projections for a simplified version of 
the proposed cap-and-trade legislation.
25
  We run a simple regression to “estimate”  SCe , using 
these price and quantity projections as if they were data.  This regression is not based on any 
observed behavior in response to price changes; it is only meant to summarize all of the EPA 
assumptions in the form of our single  SCe   parameter.  To proceed, integrate the definition of  
SCe   to obtain: 
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







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

C
S
SC
Y p
p
ec
C
S
log)log(log   
 
where  log(c)  is the constant of integration.  The definition of  SCe   holds output constant, and 
therefore we control for output when we linearly regress equation (24) using the data in Table 21 
panel B.  We find a value for  SCe   equal to -0.6; that is, the EPA must be assuming, in effect, 
that the two pollutants are complements.
26
 
We also need the cross-price elasticities relating the composite clean input (L) to each 
pollutant (C and S).  Considine and Larson (2006) find 0.47 for the long-run Morishima-
elasticity of substitution between the quantity of labor and the SO2 emissions price  LSm .
27
  
Assuming for the moment that LSLC ee  , the theorem below shows that the cross-price Allen-
elasticity  LSe   also equals  LSm .  Since that was estimated to be 0.47, we use the rounded value 
of 0.5 for both LCe  and LSe  for our numerical example in the text. 
 
                                                             
25 See http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/economics/economicanalyses.html for this EPA analysis. 
26 The standard errors from this regression are misleadingly low, because the EPA’s modeling and projections are 
deterministic.  Our procedure here does not yield any statistical properties; it only summarizes the EPA’s 
assumptions about the many unknown parameters and the chosen model structure.  The actual “estimate” of the 
elasticity is approximately -0.62, but we simply use -0.6 to avoid unwarranted claims of accuracy in this estimation. 
27 Blackory and Roberts (1989) show that the Morishima-elasticity of substitution for quantity i and price j,  ijm , is 
related to the Allen-elasticity of substitution by the algebraic identity   iiejieYiijm  . 
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Theorem:  Let  ),,( kjiY   be a CRTS production function of three inputs for a profit 
maximizing firm, let  ijm   denote the cross-price Morishima-elasticity for input i and price j, and 
let  ije   denote the cross-price Allen-elasticity for quantity i and price j.  If  ikij ee  , then  
ijij em  . 
 
Proof:  Blackorby and Roberts (1989) show that  iijiij aam  , where  ija   is the partial 
elasticity of substitution in production, and where  ijYjij ea  .  Recall,  jiij ee  , and  Yj   is the 
factor share of income for input j in the production of good  Y, so  1 YkYjYi  .  Also, the 
condition  0 ikijii aaa   is a property of the profit maximizing firm’s optimum, and thus  
0 ikYkijYjiiYi eee  .  Under our assumption  ikij ee  , it holds that    iiYiijYkYj ee   , 
and: 
 
.ij
ijYkYjijYi
iiYiijYi
iiYijiYi
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ee
ee
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aam








 
 
References 
Allen, R. G. D. (1938): Mathematical Analysis for Economists. St. Martin’s Press, New York. 
 
Ambec, S., and J. Coria (2013): “Prices vs. Quantities with Multiple Pollutants,” Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, 66(1), 123-40. 
 
Blackorby, C.s, and R. R. Russell (1989): “Will the Real Elasticity of Substitution Please Stand 
Up? (A Comparison of the Allen/Uzawa and Morishima Elasticities,” American Economic 
Review, 84(4), 1085-89. 
 
Burtraw, D., A. Krupnick, E. Mansur, D. Austin, and D. Farrell (1998): “Costs and Benefits of 
Reducing Air Pollutants Related to Acid Rain,” Contemporary Economic Policy, 16(4), 379-
400. 
 
Burtraw, D., A. Krupnick, K. Palmer, A. Paul, M. Toman, and C. Bloyd (2003): “Ancillary 
Benefits of Reduced Air Pollution in the US from Moderate Greenhouse Gas Mitigation 
85 
 
Policies in the Electricity Sector,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 
45(3), 650-73. 
 
Carlson, C., D. Burtraw, M. Cropper, and K. L. Palmer (2000): “Sulfur Dioxide Control by 
Electric Utilities: What Are the Gains from Trade?,” Journal of Political Economy, 16(4), 
379-400. 
 
Considine, T. J., and D. F. Larson (2006): “The Environment as a Factor of Production,” Journal 
of Environmental Economics and Management, 52(3), 645-62. 
 
Duhigg, C. (2009): “Cleansing the Air at the Expense of Waterways,” New York Times, 
published October 12, 2009. 
 
Fullerton, D., and G. Heutel (2007): “The General Equilibrium Incidence of Environmental 
Taxes,” Journal of Public Economics, 91(3-4), 571-91. 
 
Fullerton, D., and G. Heutel (2010): “The General Equilibrium Incidence of Environmental 
Mandates,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2(3), 64-89. 
 
Fullerton, D., G. Heutel, and G. Metcalf (2012): “Does the Indexing of Government Transfers 
Make Carbon Pricing Progressive?,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 94(2), 
347-53. 
 
Fullerton, D., and G. Metcalf (2001): “Environmental Controls, Scarcity Rents, and Pre-existing 
Distortions,” Journal of Public Economics, 80(2), 249-67. 
 
Baylis, K., D. Fullerton, and D. H. Karney (2014): “Negative Leakage,” Journal of the 
Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, forthcoming. 
 
Groosman, B., N. Z. Muller, and E. O’Neill (2011): “The Ancillary Benefits from Climate Policy 
in the United States,” Environmental and Resource Economics, 50(4), 585-603. 
 
Harberger, A. C. (1962): “The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax,” Journal of Political 
Economy, 70(3), 215-40. 
 
Harberger, A. C. (1966): “Efficiency Effects of Taxes on Income from Capital,” in M. 
Krzyzaniak, ed., Effects of Corporation Income Tax (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 
1966). 
 
Hassett, K., A. Mathur, and G. Metcalf (2009): “The Incidence of a U.S. Carbon Tax: A Lifetime 
and Regional Analysis,” Energy Journal, 30(2), 155-77. 
 
Holland, S. P. (2012a): “Emissions Taxes and versus Intensity Standards: Second-Best 
Environmental Policies with Incomplete Regulation,” Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management, 63(3), 375-87. 
 
86 
 
Holland, S. P. (2012b): “Spillovers from Climate Policy,” in The Design of Implementation of 
Climate Policy, Don Fullerton and Catherine Wolfram, editors, University of Chicago Press. 
 
Metcalf, G., and D. Weisbach (2009): “The Design of a Carbon Tax,” Harvard Environmental 
Law Review, 33(2), 499-556. 
 
Mieszkowski, P. (1972): “The Property Tax: An Excise Tax or a Profits Tax?,” The Journal of 
Public Economics, 1(1), 73-96. 
 
Muller, N. Z., and R. Mendelsohn (2009): “Efficient Pollution Regulation: Getting the Right 
Prices,” American Economic Review, 99(5), 1714-39. 
 
Ren, X., D. Fullerton, and J. B. Braden (2011): “Optimal Taxation of Externalities Interacting 
through Markets: A Theoretical General Equilibrium Analysis,” Resources and Energy 
Economics, 33(3), 496-514. 
 
Research Triangle Institute [RTI] (2008): “Documentation of the Applied Dynamic Analysis of 
the Global Economy (ADAGE) Model,” Working Paper 08_01 (link: 
http://www.rti.org/pubs/adage-model-doc_ross_sep08.pdf), Durham, NC. 
 
Schmalensee, R., P. L. Joskow, A. D. Ellerman, J. P. Montero, and E. M. Baily (1998): “An 
Interim Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Trading,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 12(3), 53-68. 
 
Tol, R. S. J. (2009): “The Economic Effects of Climate Change,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 23(2), 29-51. 
 
U.S. BEA (2009): “National Income and Product Accounts Tables: 1.5.5. GDP”, (link: 
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Selected=N), Washington, DC. 
 
U.S. EIA (2009): “Electric Power Monthly: July 2009 [Table 19.2]”, (link: 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/archive/pdf/02260907.pdf), Washington, DC. 
 
U.S EPA (2009a): “2009 U.S. Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report”, Table ES-2: Recent Trends in 
U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks, (link: 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/usinventoryreport09.html), Washington, DC. 
 
U.S. EPA (2009b): “National Emissions Inventory (NEI) Air Pollution Emissions Trend Data”, 
Sulfur Dioxide Annual Data, (link: http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/trends/), Washington, DC. 
 
Weitzman, M. L. (1974): “Prices vs. Quantities,” The Review of Economic Studies, 41(4), 477-
91. 
 
  
87 
 
Tables and Figures 
 
Table 15: Policy Scenario Matrix, for a Change in Carbon Policy 
 Sulfur Tax Sulfur Permit 
Carbon 
Tax 
0ˆ Cp  
0ˆ Sp  
(Tax-Tax) 
0ˆ Cp  
0ˆ S  
(Tax-Permit) 
Carbon 
Permit 
0ˆ YC  
0ˆ Sp  
(Permit-Tax) 
0ˆ YC  
0ˆ S  
(Permit-Permit) 
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Table 16: Base-case Levels 
Level Variable Value Units Source 
YC  2,397.2 MMtons U.S. EPA (2009a) 
Cp  15.0 $/metric ton 
Hassett, Mathur, and 
Metcalf (2009) 
YCCp  36.0 $ billions Authors’ calculation 
S  8,973.0 MMtons U.S. EPA (2009b) 
Sp  530.0 $/metric ton Bloomberg Data 
SpS  4.8 $ billions Authors’ calculation 
XC  3,338.6 MMtons U.S. EPA (2009a) 
C  5.0 $/metric ton Authors’ assumption 
XCCr  16.7 $ billions Authors’ calculation 
I = GDP 13,807.5 $ billions U.S. BEA (2009) 
YpY  343.7 $ billions U.S. EIA (2009) 
XpX  13,463.8 $ billions Authors’ calculation 
SpCpR SYC   40.7 $ billions Authors’ assumption 
YL Lp  303.0 $ billions Authors’ calculation 
XL Lp  13,447.1 $ billions Authors’ calculation 
YXX LLCL   13,766.8 $ billions Authors’ calculation 
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Table 17: Base-case Parameter Values 
Parameter Value Source 
Panel A: Share Parameters 
XCXLX    0.978 
See Table 16 
LLYY   0.022 
 YpL YYYL   0.882 
See Table 16    YpCp YYCYC   0.105 
   YpSp YSYS   0.014 
Panel B: Allen-Elasticities 
SCe  -0.6 Authors’ calculation 
LSe  0.5 Considine and Larson (2006) 
LCe  0.5 Authors’ assumption 
LLe  -0.1 
Authors’ calculation CCe  -4.1 
SSe  -27.3 
Panel C: Other Parameters 
U  0.25 RTI (2008) 
C  39 Tol (2009) 
S  1,510 Muller and Mendelsohn (2009) 
Notes: Values subject to independent rounding. 
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Table 18: Base-case Results (% change) 
Variable/Policy 
Scenario 
Tax-Tax 
[Baseline]  
(1) 
Tax-Permit 
[Match Tax]  
(2) 
Tax-Permit 
[Match 
Carbon] 
(3) 
Tax-Permit 
[Match 
Welfare]  
(4) 
Panel A: Quantity and Price Changes 
YCˆ  -4.59 -4.56 -4.59 -9.42 
Cpˆ  10.00 10.00 10.06 20.64 
Sˆ  -0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Spˆ  0.00 -2.35 -2.36 -4.84 
YLˆ  0.26 0.25 0.25 0.51 
Ypˆ  1.05 1.01 1.02 2.09 
Yˆ  -0.27 -0.26 -0.26 -0.53 
XX CLX
ˆˆˆ   -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.012 
Panel B: Welfare Changes [Base-case] 
(MEDs:  0.39C   and  1510S ) 
From YCˆ  0.287 0.286 0.287 0.589 
From Sˆ  0.303 0.000 0.000 0.000 
From XCˆ  0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0005 
Overall % 0.589 0.286 0.287 0.589 
$ billions 8.14 3.94 3.96 8.14 
Panel C: Alternate Welfare Changes [Sensitivity Analysis] 
(MEDs:  5.19C   and  755S ) 
From YCˆ  0.054 0.053 0.054 0.123 
From Sˆ  0.070 0.000 0.000 0.000 
From XCˆ  0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.0001 
Overall % 0.123 0.053 0.054 0.591 
$ billions 1.80 0.73 0.74 1.70 
Note: Grey cells indicate exogenously set variable.  Each cell is independently rounded. 
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Table 19: Base-case Output and Substitution Effects (% change) 
Variable/Policy 
Scenario Name 
Tax-Tax 
[Baseline] 
 27.0ˆ Y   
(1) 
Tax-Permit 
[Match Tax] 
 26.0ˆ Y   
(2) 
Tax-Permit 
[Match 
Carbon] 
 26.0ˆ Y  
(3) 
Tax-Permit 
[Match 
Welfare] 
 53.0ˆ Y   
(4) 
YCˆ  -4.59 -4.56 -4.59 -9.43 
Output:
 
-0.27 -0.26 -0.26 -0.53 
Substitution:
 
-4.32 -4.31 -4.33 -8.89 
Ratio 
[Sub/Out]: 
16.18 16.62 16.62 16.62 
Sˆ  -0.90 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Output:
 
-0.27 - - - 
Substitution:
 
-0.63 - - - 
Ratio 
[Sub/Out]: 
2.35 - - - 
YLˆ  0.26 0.25 0.25 0.51 
Output:
 
-0.27 -0.26 -0.26 -0.53 
Substitution:
 
0.52 0.51 0.51 1.05 
Ratio 
[Sub/Out]: 
-1.96 -1.96 -1.96 -1.96 
Note: Grey cells indicate exogenously set variable.  Each cell is independently rounded. 
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Table 20: Alternative Tax-Permit Scenarios (% change)  
Variable/Policy 
Scenario 
Tax-Tax 
[Baseline]  
(1) 
Tax-Permit 
[Match  
Sulfur]  
(2) 
Tax-Permit 
[Match 
Carbon] 
(3) 
Tax-Permit 
[Match 
Welfare]  
(4) 
Panel A: Quantity and Price Changes 
YCˆ  -4.59 -0.03 n/a -0.06 
Cpˆ  10.00 0.00 n/a 0.00 
Sˆ  -0.90 -0.90 n/a -1.74 
Spˆ  0.00 2.35 n/a 4.55 
YLˆ  0.26 0.01 n/a 0.02 
Ypˆ  1.05 0.03 n/a 0.06 
Yˆ  -0.27 -0.01 n/a -0.02 
XX CLX
ˆˆˆ   -0.006 -0.0002 n/a -0.0003 
Panel B: Welfare Changes [Base-case] 
(MEDs:  0.39C   and  1510S ) 
From YCˆ  0.287 0.002 n/a 0.003 
From Sˆ  0.303 0.303 n/a 0.588 
From XCˆ  0.0002 0.0000 n/a 0.0000 
Overall % 0.589 0.305 n/a 0.591 
$ billions 8.14 4.20 n/a 8.14 
Panel C: Alternate Welfare Changes [Sensitivity Analysis] 
(MEDs:  5.19C   and  755S ) 
From YCˆ  0.054 0.000 n/a 0.001 
From Sˆ  0.070 0.070 n/a 0.135 
From XCˆ  0.0000 0.0000 n/a 0.0000 
Overall % 0.123 0.070 n/a 0.136 
$ billions 1.80 0.96 n/a 1.87 
Note: Grey cells indicate exogenously set variable.  Each cell is independently rounded.  The 
“n/a” in column (3) indicates such a scenario does not fall within the bounds of our model.  
93 
 
Table 21: Share Sensitivity (% change) 
Variable/Policy 
Sensitivity 
Base-case 
(1) 
Double 
Sulfur Share 
 028.0YS   
(2) 
Double 
Carbon Share 
 209.0YC   
 (3) 
Double 
Sulfur & 
Carbon 
Shares 
(4) 
Panel A: Tax-Tax Scenario 
Yˆ  -0.27 -0.27 -0.53 -0.53 
YCˆ  -4.59 -4.44 -4.34 -4.18 
Sˆ  -0.90 -0.90 -1.79 -1.79 
Panel B: Tax-Permit Scenario [Match Tax] 
Yˆ  -0.26 -0.25 -0.51 -0.49 
YCˆ  -4.56 -4.38 -4.26 -4.02 
Sˆ  0 0 0 0 
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Table 22: U.S. EPA’s Projected Input-Output and Quantity-Price Pairs for SO2 and CO2 
Emissions, for Electricity Generating Sector (2006 Dollars) 
Year 
Total 
Generation 
Cost  
($billions) 
Total 
Electricity 
Output 
(TWh) 
SO2 
Quantity 
(Mtons) 
SO2 
Price 
($/ton) 
CO2 
Quantity 
(MMtons) 
CO2 
Price 
($/metric 
ton) 
Panel A: Business-As-Usual 
2012 123.8 4096 4277 283 2362 - 
2015 131.5 4142 4005 255 2359 - 
2020 150.9 4352 3833 308 2462 - 
2025 165.7 4578 3691 415 2566 - 
Panel B: HR 2454 
2012 120.7 4056 4627 130 2272 11.34 
2015 121.1 3966 4119 117 2164 13.14 
2020 126.5 3930 3818 142 2065 16.95 
2025 138.1 4044 3523 191 2008 21.59 
(Note: The EPA’s analysis only reports values for the four years included in the table.  The sulfur 
dioxide quantity-price pairs come from the national Acid Rain Program’s cap-and-trade regime.  
TWh is a terawatt-hour or 10^12 watt-hours, a unit of energy.) 
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Figure 7: Tax-Tax Sensitivity Analysis: Carbon Quantity ( YCˆ  on Vertical Axis) 
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Figure 8: Tax-Tax Sensitivity Analysis: Sulfur Quantity ( Sˆ   on the vertical axis) 
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Figure 9: Tax-Tax Sensitivity: Welfare Change ($ billion on the vertical axis) 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
General Equilibrium Models with  
Morishima Elasticities of Substitution in Production  
 
Harberger (1962) introduces an important class of an analytical general equilibrium (AGE) 
model.  Originally designed to evaluate the incidence of a corporate income tax, the Harberger 
model has been used over the past 50 years to investigate many different issues ranging from the 
incidence of the local property tax [Mieszkowski (1972)] to the double-dividend hypothesis in 
environmental policy [Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994}].  Meanwhile, others research extends 
Harberger's original model by relaxing initial assumptions [e.g. Rapanos (1986)].  Following 
Mieszkowski (1972), when production functions employ three or more inputs, Harberger-style 
models most often use the Allen elasticity of substitution (AES) to measure trade-offs in 
production.  The AES determines whether two inputs are price substitutes; that is, when an 
increase in price j   jp   leads to an increase in quantity i   ix   [Allen (1938)].  Meanwhile, a 
different elasticity concept called the Morishima elasticity of substitution (MES) measures the 
change in relative inputs given a change in relative input prices.  In other words, the MES 
captures the effect of a change in the ratio of input prices   ji pp   on the corresponding input 
ratio   ji xx , and thus more closely follows the usual notion of ``substitution in production'' 
[Blackorby and Russell (1989)]. 
Since the AES and MES have different interpretations, I reformulate the model in 
Fullerton and Heutel (2007) [hereafter FH (2007)] that originally employs Allen elasticities to 
use Morishima elasticities instead.  In doing so, I show how to construct an AGE model using 
Morishima elasticities of substitution, and demonstrate how the MES formulation provides an 
additional and useful set of interpretations.  One useful property is that when using the MES 
formulation the signs and magnitudes of the Morishima elasticities in a three-input sector can be 
directly compared to the single elasticity value in a two-input sector (since the elasticity of 
substitution in a sector with only two inputs is unambiguously defined as the change in relative 
inputs given a change in relative input prices).  Another important feature of the MES 
formulation come from the fact that placing straight-forward restrictions on the Morishima 
elasticities is equivalent to assuming specific, non-trivial forms of the production function.  For 
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instance, Morishima elasticities are symmetric if and only if a three-input production function 
exhibits constant elasticity of substitution [Blackorby and Russell (1989)].
1
  In short, this chapter 
builds the first analytical general equilibrium model using the Morishima elasticity of 
substitution. 
Furthermore, the theorems and techniques below demonstrate how to switch between 
AES and MES measures in the same AGE model.  That is, I show a one-to-one numerical 
equivalence between models with the same under lying primitives, regardless of whether Allen 
or Morishima elasticities are used to measure substitution in production.  The equivalence occurs 
because both Allen and Morishima elasticities are net elasticities derived from the dual (cost-
minimization) problem.  Therefore, equivalently parameterized models lead to the same 
numerical solutions, where ``equivalently parameterized'' means that the theoretical relationship 
between Allen and Morishima elasticities also holds numerically, and all other parameters have 
the same values. 
This chapter then connects three different literatures.  First, the production theory 
literature establishes the theoretical basis for the AES and MES (see Stern (2011) for an 
overview).  Second, a large literature estimates empirical values of Morishima elasticities in 
different contexts.  These estimates are then used in either partial equilibrium analysis or as 
parameters in large general equilibrium model.  For example, Koetse et al (2008) provides a 
meta-analysis of over 100 Morishima capital-energy substitution elasticities.  In another 
example, Considine and Larson (2006) estimates the Morishima elasticity between clean inputs 
(i.e. labor) and sulfur-dioxide emission emissions at coal-fired power plants. Third, applied 
theory papers with analytical general equilibrium modeling traditionally use Allen elasticities of 
substitution in their formulation.  In addition to citations above, de Mooij and Bovenberg (1998) 
and Fullerton and Monti (2013) are two more examples of models that employ the AES.  Indeed, 
the results below provide a ready-made template for applying Morishima elasticity estimates to 
existing models formulated with Allen elasticities. 
The chapter proceeds as follows.  Section 1 reviews the production theory literature 
regarding the Morishima elasticity of substitution, describes its properties, and provides 
theorems that specify under what conditions the MES is positive (substitute) or negative 
                                                             
1 Although the AES and MES formulations in the paper are only applied to three-input production functions, the 
techniques generalize to production functions with four or more inputs. 
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(complement).  It then compares and contrasts the MES with the AES, and gives a formal 
equivalence between the two elasticity measures. 
Section 2 presents a reformulated version of FH (2007).  The model has a ``clean'' sector 
that only uses capital and labor in production, and a ``dirty'' sector uses capital, labor, and 
pollution.  The authors then derive the incidence of a pollution tax on the price of the ``dirty'' 
good, return to capital, and wage rate.  The reformulation replaces their use of Allen elasticities 
with Morishima elasticities that measure the trade-offs in the ``dirty'' sector between its three 
inputs. 
Section 3 provides general, closed-form solutions under the Morishima elasticity 
formulation.  Interpretation is aided by comparing the general solutions to solutions from a 
simpler model that collapses capital and labor into a single composite input.  This section also 
includes two special cases with specific parameter restrictions that highlight intuition from the 
general solutions.  The first and most important of these special cases requires the use of 
symmetric Morishima elasticities, which eliminates the possibility of a negative denominator in 
the closed-form solutions (which can lead to perverse results). 
Section 4 provides sufficient conditions to guarantee that the closed-form solutions have 
a positive denominator, and it calculates the Morishima elasticities corresponding to the 
numerical examples in FH (2007).  In addition, I show the one-to-one numerical equivalence 
between models with the same under lying primitives, regardless of whether Allen or Morishima 
elasticities characterize substitution in production.  Thus, the two modeling methodologies are 
complementary, with the reformulation here aiding interpretation.  Section 6 briefly summarizes 
results. 
 
1 The Morishima Elasticity of Substitution 
The Morishima elasticity of substitution (MES) was independently formulated by Morishima 
(1967) and Blackorby and Russell (1975) (as Morishima (1967) was published in Japanese only).  
The main insight of Morishima is that elasticities of substitution for input ratios are inherently 
asymmetric given more than two inputs.  The MES gained notoriety after Blackorby and Russell 
(1989) argues that the MES is the natural generalization of the Hicks (1932) two-input elasticity 
of substitution [Anderson and Moroney (1993)].  Although Blackorby and Russell (1989) 
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compares Allen and Morishima elasticities, as indicated in their title, they only apply their results 
to partial equilibrium analysis while this chapter extends the comparison to general equilibrium 
models.  Importantly, Davis and Shumway (1996) shows that if the production function is 
homothetic, then the MES is the unique measure of changes in relative factors for changes in 
relative input prices.
2
 
Following Stern (2011)'s notation, the definition of the MES between inputs i and j  
 ji  , and denoted ijm  is given: 
 
    
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ij
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ln
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,,ln






pp
 (1) 
 
where  y  is the output quantity, p is the vector of input prices, and pi is the price of input i. Also, 
the cost function is   p,yC , so that Ci is the derivative of the cost function with respect to the ith  
price.  Recall Shepard's Lemma states that    ii xyC p, , where xi is the input quantity 
demanded for input i conditional on output level y and prices p.  Then, by definition, the MES is 
an elasticity that measures the change in the input ratio with respect to a change in the price ratio, 
while holding output constant and letting all other inputs adjust optimally holding their prices 
constant.  If  0ijm , then inputs i and j are Morishima substitutes; if 0ijm , then the two 
inputs are Morishima complements. 
Using the dual formulation of Uzawa (1962) and exploiting Shepard's Lemma, Blackorby 
and Russell (1989) goes on to show that for a change in pi then mij can be decomposed into two 
parts as follows: 
 
   pp ,, yym iijiij    (2) 
 
 
                                                             
2 Davis and Shumway (1996) develops the generalized factor ratio elasticity of substitution (FRES) that nests the 
MES as a special case.  The FRES does not require homotheticity to be interpreted as the measure of the percentage 
change in relative factor use for a percentage change in relative input price. 
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where  ji   is the constant-output, cross-price elasticity of input j with respect to price i;  
specifically,    ijji pxy lnln, p .  As Blackorby and Russell (1989) explains, ``The effect 
of this variation in   ji pp   in the ith coordinate direction [given pj] on the [input] quantity ratio 
 ji xx , divides into two parts: the (proportional) effect on xj on varying pi (given by  p,yji ) 
and the (proportional) effect on xi of varying pi (given by  p,yii )''.
3
  A way to observe the 
asymmetry of the MES is to note that     pp ,, yym jjijji   , so that in general jiij mm  .  In 
fact, symmetric Morishima elasticities arise if and only if the production function has a constant 
elasticity of substitution for all inputs [Blackorby and Russell (1989)].   
Before continuing, I pause to highlight some important properties of the MES in the 
following simple theorems.  
 
Theorem 1. If 0ji  , then  0ijm . 
Theorem 2. If 0ijm , then  0ji . 
Theorem 3. jiii    if and only if  0ijm . 
Proof.  See section 6 for all proofs in this chapter. 
 
Theorems 1 and 2 follow directly from the MES expression of Blackorby and Russell (1989), 
after noting that 0ii  for all inputs i [Chambers (1988)].  Theorem 1 says that when an 
increase in price i leads to no decrease in input j   0ji , then the Morishima elasticity for 
inputs i and j is always non-negative  0ijm .  For instance, 0ji  means inputs i and j are 
price substitutes, so as the price of input i increases then the quantity of input j rises; meanwhile, 
assuming 0ii  the quantity of input i falls as its price rises.  Thus, the ratio of prices  ij pp  
falls as pj remains constant and the input ratio  ji xx  also falls too, meaning  0ijm   since 
both the numerator and denominator in equation 1 are negative.  Theorem 2 follows directly 
from theorem 1, and observes that if two inputs are Morishima complements, then they must be 
price complements.  In other words, 0ji   is a necessary condition for  0ijm .  Importantly, 
                                                             
3 I omit Blackorby and Russell (1989)'s use of the superscript ``*'' on the xi's that indicate optimality of the input 
choice given the output level and price vector. 
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the necessary and sufficient condition in theorem 3 says that even when the necessary condition 
in theorem 2 is satisfied, if input i falls more than input j falls given an increase in price i, then 
the Morishima elasticity is still positive.  That is, when the own-price demand is steeper than the 
cross-price demand, then theorem 3 holds, even if inputs i and j are price complements.  
In contrast, the Allen elasticity of substitution (AES) was originally introduced by Allen 
(1938 in order to obtain a particular net elasticity measure.  Again, following Stern (2011)'s 
notation (and borrowing from Berndt and Wood (1975)), the definition of the AES between 
inputs i and j (including ji  ), and denoted  ije   is given: 
 
   
   
 
j
ii
j
i
jji
ij
ij
S
y
p
x
SyCyC
yCyC
e
p
pp
pp ,
ln
ln1
,,
,, 



  (3) 
 
where  p,yCij  is the twice-partial derivative of the cost function with respect to inputs prices i 
and j.  Also, Sj is the cost share of input j in the production of good Y.  Since 0jS  (assuming 
an interior solution), then ije  always has the same sign as the constant-output, cross-price 
elasticity ij .  In addition, the AES is symmetric so that jiij ee  .  Although, Chambers (1988) 
observes that in general jiij    despite )sign()sign( jiij   .  The AES is then used to classify 
inputs not just as substitutes or complements (Morishima) but as ``price substitutes'' or ``price 
complements''.
4
  By the definition and properties of the AES, then the following three theorems 
hold.  
 
Theorem 4.  If 0jie  , then  0ijm . 
Theorem 5.  If 0ijm , then  0jie . 
Theorem 6.  jiii ee   if and only if  0ijm . 
 
These three theorems follow directly from the previous three theorems, but instead relate 
properties of the AES to properties of the MES. 
                                                             
4 Other research has found additional uses for the AES; for instance,  Christev and Featherstone (2009) shows how 
the AES is closely link to the shape of the cost function. 
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Importantly, both the MES and AES are net elasticities derived from the dual (cost-
minimization) problem where the output quantity is held constant.
5
  However, when the optimal 
response to an input price change involves adjusting the output level, then a gross elasticity is the 
relevant measure (though net and gross elasticities are equivalent when the production function 
exhibits constant returns to scale).
6
   
Although both Blackorby and Russell (1989) and Stern (2011) show expressions (2) and 
(3) involving ij , neither explicitly provides the formal connection between the MES  ijm  and 
AES  ije , as the production theory literature emphasizes the differences between elasticity 
measures.  Yet, the MES and AES are closely linked as net elasticities derived from the dual 
problem, they have a formal equivalence given in the theorem below. 
 
Theorem 7.     iiijiiijiiij eeSeeSm  . 
 
Theorem 7 says that a Morishima elasticity is the difference between two Allen elasticities 
multiplied by a cost share, and follows directly from expressions (2) and (3) and the symmetric 
property of the AES.  I use this theorem below to reformulate an AES model as a MES model to 
gain additional insight and interpretation of its results.   
 
2 Model 
This section presents a reformulated version of Fullerton and Heutel (2007), using Morishima 
elasticities instead of Allen elasticities.  In this model the ``clean'' sector only uses capital and 
labor in production.  Meanwhile, the ``dirty'' sector uses capital, labor, and pollution.  I 
characterize the trade-off in production in the dirty sector using Morishima elasticities.  The 
model derives the theoretical incidence of a pollution tax on the price of the ``dirty'' good, return 
to capital, and wage rate.    
                                                             
5
 In an earlier taxonomy of Mundlak (1968), the MES is called a ``two-factor-one-price'' elasticity even though it 
still uses the ratio pj/pi.  Meanwhile, in the same taxonomy, the AES is called a ``one-factor-one-price'' elasticity.  
The current taxonomy of Stern (2011) clarifies the relationship between the MES and AES, and builds on Mundlak 
(1968) by adding elasticities from the primal (profit-maximization) problem. 
 
6 That is, under constant returns to scale the MES is equivalent to the Morishima gross elasticity of substitution 
(MGES), and the AES is equivalent to the Hotelling-Lau elasticity of substitution (HLES), see Stern (2011) Table 2. 
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As in FH (2007), the model is used to solve for all changes in prices and quantities that result 
from an exogenous increase in the pollution tax.  In fact, the model here is identical to their 
model with the exception that I use Morishima elasticities of substitution instead of Allen 
elasticities when modeling the three input production function.  The model assumes perfect 
information, perfect competition, many identical agents, existence of lump-sum transfers, 
costless policy enforcement, and perfectly mobile factors of production.  Furthermore, the model 
compares long-run equilibrium and does not account for adjustments during transition.  Since it 
is a long-run model with cost minimization, using elasticities derived from the dual problem 
provides an appropriate measure of substitution in production, such as the Morishima elasticity 
of substitution.       
Denote pX as the market clearing price for a clean good X, and pY as the market clearing 
price for a dirty good Y.  Consumers have fixed resource endowments of capital  K  and labor 
 L , so the resource constraints are YX KKK   and YX LLL  .  Then, KX denotes the 
capital employed in sector X with the other variables analogously defined.  Both factors are 
perfectly mobile and can be used by either sector with market clearing prices r for capital and w 
for labor.  Goods are produced via constant return to scale (CRTS) production functions with 
general forms  XX LKXX ,  and  ZLKYY YY ,, , respectively.  Sector Y is the ``dirty'' 
sector and thus pollution (Z) is a third variable input to production. 
For each unit of pollution, firms in sector Y must pay a tax   Z .  All inputs are 
necessary for production in both sectors, so even though pollution is not a priori limited via a 
resource constraint, an initial pollution tax yields a finite level of pollution where the marginal 
product of Z is set equal to Z .  The government returns all pollution tax revenue via a lump-
sum transfer, ZR Z .  Many identical consumers have a general utility function denoted  
 ZYXUU ;, , such that pollution is separable in utility.  Consumers choose their level of 
goods X and Y, but not pollution.   
To get the system of linear equations as in Harberger (1962), begin by totally 
differentiating the resource constraints:  
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YKYXKX KK
ˆˆ0    (4) 
YLYXlX LL
ˆˆ0    (5) 
 
where the ``hat'' notation denotes a proportional change   XXX KKK dˆ  , and  ij  denotes 
sector g's share of factor i (e.g  KK XKX / ). 
Next, totally differentiate the production functions to show how final outputs change 
when firms adjust input quantities:  
 
XXLXXK LKX
ˆˆˆ    (6) 
ZLKY YZYYLYYK
ˆˆˆˆ    (7) 
 
where gi  is the factor share of income for input i in the production of good g (e.g. 
XpKp XXKXK  ). 
Sector X has two inputs, so relative factor intensity responds to changes in relative prices 
according to the elasticity of substitution, X .  Note that 0X  applies to a two input 
production function, so the two inputs are always substitutes.  Differentiating the definition of 
X :  
 
 .ˆˆˆˆ rwLK XXX    (8) 
 
With CRTS production functions, the zero profit conditions are XXX wLrKXp   and 
ZwLrKYp ZYYY  .  So, totally differentiate these equations and use the profit maximizing 
first-order conditions:  
 
   XXLXXKX LwKrXp ˆˆˆˆˆˆ    (9) 
     .ˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆ ZLwKrYp ZYZXYLYYKY    (10) 
 
107 
 
 
The model represents consumer preferences using the elasticity of substitution in utility, 
0U .  Differentiating the definition of U  yields the quantity demand changes from a shift in 
output prices: 
  
 XYU ppYX ˆˆˆˆ    (11) 
 
Finally, to handle three inputs in sector Y, I deviate from the previous literature such as 
FH (2007) that follows Mieszkowski (1972) in using Allen elasticities of substitution to measure 
trade-offs in production.  Instead, recall that mij measures the change in the input ratio i over j for 
a change in the price ratio as a result of a change in input i's price (letting all other inputs adjust 
optimally holding their prices constant).  As shown in section 7, the relative input factor 
responses for good Y are given by:  
 
  ZZKKZZKKZY mrmwmmZK ˆˆˆˆˆ   (12) 
  ZZLLZZLLZY mwmrmmZL ˆˆˆˆˆ   (13) 
 
As with X  above, the mij 's reflect changes in input ratios for changes in price ratios, and the 
value of X  can be directly compared with the MES values.  For example, suppose    so that 
increasing Z   0ˆ Z  holding r constant leads to a fall in the ratio YKZ .  This means that if 
mij is positive, then the inputs are substitutes; however, if it is negative, then the inputs are 
complements.
7
  
 
                                                             
7 The use of Allen elasticity of substitution for three inputs depends on a 3x3 matrix of elasticities, but symmetry 
means that the matrix has six distinct Allen elasticity parameters.  However, setting the three off-diagonal Allen 
elasticities   KZLZLK eee ,,   uniquely determines the main-diagonal Allen elasticities   ZZKKLL eee ,, .  In 
contrast, using Morishima elasticities requires setting four elasticities, where in the model above mKL and mLK are 
removed by substitution. 
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3 Results and Interpretations 
Before examining the solutions to the full model presented above, it is useful to solve for the 
closed-form solutions in a simpler model to aide with interpretation of the more complex model.   
 
3.A Simple Model Solutions 
This simple model has only one clean input, such as a composite of capital and labor.  With only 
one clean input (here called ``capital''), the production functions become XKX   and 
 ZKYY Y , , along with the analogous changes in the zero-profit conditions.  With good X as 
numeraire, then  0ˆˆ  rpX , since sector X only uses capital in production, and ZYZYp  ˆˆ  .  
The change in pollution is     0ˆˆ  ZYKYYZYYUXZ  , where Y  is the elasticity 
of substitution between capital and pollution in the production of Y, and where Y  is the share of 
the composite input employed by sector Y (with all other variables analogously defined above).  
Note that 0ˆ Z  always, as both the output effect    YZYYUX     and substitution effect  
 YKY   reduce pollution.   
 
3.B General Model Solutions 
Using the full model in equations (4) to (13), I set good X as numeraire  0ˆ Xp , and solve the 
system of linear equations given an exogenous policy change of an increase in the pollution tax 
 0ˆ Z .  Alternatively, I could start with the final results in FH (2007) and apply theorem 7 to 
get closed-form solutions in terms of Morishima elasticities.  Either way, good Y’s price change 
is:  
 
   
    ZYZUYZX
ZLZKYZX
Y
BACD
BmAmCD
p 


ˆˆ 







  (14) 
 
where the parameter definitions as in FH (2007) are 
X
Y
KX
KY
K
K
K



  and  
X
Y
LX
LY
L
L
L



 , 
 YKKXKK    and  YLLXLL   ,   YZLKKLA     and 
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  YZKLLKB   , and  YZKLC   .  It is clear that A>0, B>0, and C>0.  The 
i 's measure the factor shares across sectors for capital and labor; for instance,  1K   if sector 
Y uses more capital than sector X in absolute terms.  Note that     YZLKBA   .  In 
addition, define   XKYLXLYK   , and the following theorem helps with the interpretation 
of results.      
 
Theorem 8.  In this model,    0 BA , always. 
 
However, I depart from the definitions in FH (2007) by defining   LK BDADD    as a 
collection of sector Y production elasticities, where DK collects terms involving the Morishima 
elasticities mKZ and mZK; specifically,   XKZKKZK mmD  .  Similarly, DL collects of term 
involving the Morishima elasticities mLZ and mZL, where  XLZLLZL mmD  .  The mij 's do not 
have sign or magnitude restrictions, so D does not have a definitive sign.  For the remainder of 
this section, assume D>0 and thus the denominator of (14) is always positive, and see section 4 
for an analysis that shows D>0 for a wide range of parameter values. 
Since the closed-form solution to the change in price of good Y in the simple case is 
0ˆˆ  ZYZYp  , then the bracketed term in equation (14) can be interpreted as a scalar that 
accounts for splitting the composite input into the constituent labor and capital.  Depending on 
parameter values the scalar can be positive or negative, so in general the price of good Y can 
either increase or decrease.  Interestingly, U   appears once in the general solution to Ypˆ , and 
appears positively in the denominator.  Using the result in theorem 8, it is clear that increasing 
U  means making the denominator a larger positive value.  Thus, as U  goes to   then Ypˆ  
goes to zero.  In words, if goods X and Y are perfect substitutes in utility, then in equilibrium they 
must have the same price (recalling 0ˆ Xp ).  Furthermore, the term XC  appears in both the 
numerator and denominator of equation (14), so as X  goes to   then Ypˆ  converges to ZYZ ˆ .  
Intuitively, if capital and labor are perfect substitutes in sector X, then the complex model reverts 
to the simple, single composite input case, regardless of the substitution elasticities in sector Y. 
Importantly, the Morishima elasticity formulation allows for the direct comparison 
between the elasticity magnitudes of X  (or U ) and mZK (or mZL), as section 1 explains and 
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section 3.3 below demonstrates.  In the Allen elasticity formulation of FH (2007) one cannot 
directly compare 
X  (or U ) to any of the Allen elasticity values.
8
   
Next, the general solutions for the capital and labor prices are:  
 
   
    ZYZXLUYZX
UZLZK
BACD
BABmAm
r 
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  (15) 
   
    ZYZXKUYZX
UZLZK
BACD
BABmAm
w 


ˆˆ 







 . (16) 
 
The closed-form solutions in (15) and (16) at first appear complex, but can be readily interpreted.  
To start, note that rˆ  and wˆ  have the exact same scalar in the bracketed terms.  Thus, they 
always have opposite signs, due to the choice of good X as numeraire (as easily seen after 
subtracting equation (6) from (9) to yield  wr XLXK ˆˆ0   ).  That is, relative to the numeraire, 
one input price must rise and the other must fall.   
To aid interpretation, consider the terminology of Mieszkowski (1967) that discusses the 
effect of factor prices of a tax on one factor in one sector: the ``output effect'' refers to the fact 
that the tax raises the output price and thus reduces the equilibrium quantity, which hurts any 
factor intensively used.  The ``substitution effect'' refers to the fact that the factor tax changes 
relative factor prices and induces substitution away from the taxed factor.
9
 
Note   0 BA  implies sector Y is capital intensive (since     YZLKBA   ).  So, 
when sector Y is capital intensive, and pollution in Y is taxed, this term reduces the return to 
capital (and increases the return to labor).  The situation reverses when sector Y is labor 
intensive.  That is, the intensively employed factor bears a higher tax burden due to the ``output 
effect''.   
Continuing, the term  ZLZK BmAm   is a ``substitution effect'' that depends on weighted 
Morishima elasticities.  Ignoring the weights for the moment, 0 ZLZK mm  means that the 
                                                             
8 However, the AES can be interpreted as the input-demand schedule and thus useful when interpreting that direct, 
partial effect of a tax increase. 
 
9 This terminology is quite different from the use of those terms in the analysis of the effects of a pollution tax on the 
quantity of pollution, where the substitution effect is the reduction in pollution per unit of output, and the output 
effect is the reduction in the amount of output. 
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ratio of pollution to capital falls by more than the ratio of pollution to labor (when the pollution 
tax increases).  In other words, 0 ZLZK mm  implies capital is a better substitute for pollution 
than is labor.  Thus, increasing the pollution tax leads to an increase in the relative use of capital 
in sector Y, and a corresponding rise in the return to capital.  Since A>0 and B>0, the substitution 
effect has a clear sign when ZKm  and ZLm  have opposite signs.  For example, 0ZKm  and 
0ZLm  implies the substitution effect is a positive effect on r in equation (15).  Therefore, in 
the general case, the ``output effect'' and ``substitution effect'' can have the same or different 
signs. 
Also, both the numerator and denominator of rˆ  and wˆ  have the parameter U ; thus, as 
U  gets large, the factor prices do not go to zero.
10
  That is, even if the goods are perfect 
substitutes, the difference in production technologies means that the factor intensively used in 
sector Y still faces a higher burden.  However, X  only appears in the denominator of rˆ  and wˆ .  
Thus, as X  gets large then  rˆ  and wˆ  go to zero.  Again, if capital and labor are perfect 
substitutes in sector X, then the model reverts to the simple, single composite input case. 
 
3.C Special Cases 
To highlight intuition from the general solutions, I analyze three special cases with specific 
parameter restrictions.  The first and most important of these special cases is the one with 
symmetric Morishima elasticities, which eliminates the possibility of having a negative 
denominator (as can happen with general solutions). 
 
3.C.1 Symmetric Morishima Elasticities 
Blackorby and Russell (1989) proves that Morishima elasticities are symmetric if and only if 
they are all equal to the same positive constant, and thus characterize a constant elasticity of 
                                                             
10 Specifically, U  implies    ZYZYZXLr  ˆˆ    and    ZYZYZXLw  ˆˆ  . 
112 
 
substitution (CES) production function.
11
  Setting  0 Yjiij mm    for all inputs i and j 
means that the equations (12) and (13) simplify to:  
 
 .ˆˆˆˆ rZK ZYY    (17) 
 .ˆˆˆˆ rZK ZYX    (18) 
 
so that each looks like the factor response equation for sector X in equation (8).  Thus, these two 
equations explicitly demonstrate the meaning of a CES production function: an increase in Zˆ , 
all else equal, has the same proportional change in both input ratios KY/Z and LY/Z.  To my 
knowledge, this is the first time the symmetry result from Blackorby and Russell (1989) has been 
applied to a general equilibrium model.  Furthermore, this special case shows that Morishima 
elasticities can be directly compared in both interpretation and magnitude to the elasticity of 
substitution in sector X, since Y  plays the same role in equations (17) and (18) as X  does in 
equation (8). 
In this special case, the closed-form solutions for the price changes are:  
 
   
    ZYZUYZX
YYZX
Y
BACD
BACD
p 


ˆˆ
1
1








  (19) 
  
    ZYZXLUYZX
UY
BACD
BA
r 


ˆˆ
1








  (20) 
  
    ZYZXKUYZX
UY
BACD
BA
w 


ˆˆ
1








 . (21) 
 
Where    01  YXKXL BAD  , and thus the common denominator is always positive.  
That is, a CES production function is a sufficient condition for a positive denominator and 
removes the possibility of having a negative denominator as can be the case with general 
solutions.  Here,  0ˆ Yp  so that the price of good Y always increases (unlike the general case). 
                                                             
11 Allen elasticites of substitution are symmetric by definition, but do not characterize a CES production function.  
Furthermore, assuming a CES production function does not implying that all Allen elasticities must be equal to the 
same positive constant. 
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The numerators of (20) and (21) still have both the ``output'' and ``substitution'' effects of 
Mieszkowski (1967).  However, a CES production function implies these effects always have 
opposite signs (where in the general case the effects can either have the same or opposite signs).  
For example, in equation (20) when sector Y  is capital intensive (A-B>0), then the substitution 
effect is positive and the output effect is negative.  Thus, these effects always offset to some 
degree, as the CES production function eliminates the case of reinforcing ``output'' and 
``substitution'' effects that is possible in the general solution.
12
 
As a special case, setting 0 Yijm   for all inputs i and j eliminates all substitution in 
sector Y.  Since all changes are due to output effects, the return to capital necessarily falls if 
sector Y is capital intensive (and the opposite for the wage rate).  The price of good Y always 
increases and   YU pCZ ˆ1ˆ  , so pollution always falls since sector Y contracts as the output 
price increases and no substitution between inputs is possible. 
 
3.C.2 Equal Factor Intensities 
Setting equal factor intensities in both sectors implies 0  LK , and eliminates the 
output effects described in equations (15) to (16), recalling the ``output effect'' refers to the fact 
that the tax raises the output price which hurts any factor intensively used.  However, in this 
special case both factors have the same intensity factor.  For this reason, then U  does not 
appear in any of the solutions below.  Also, the condition LK    implies (A-B)=0.  Here, the 
closed-form solutions for the price changes are:  
 
ZYZYp  ˆˆ   (22) 
   ZXLX
LKKL
D
mm
r 

ˆ
1
ˆ
2








  (23) 
                                                             
12 The unique parameter combination 0  YU  greatly simplifies the solutions.  Specifically, under this 
condition, ZYZYp  ˆˆ  ,  0ˆˆ  wr , and ZZ  ˆ
ˆ  ,.  That is, this unique parameter combination implies the 
price of good Y always increases with the pollution tax, the relative prices of capital and labor remain the same, and 
pollution falls.  Here, the ``output'' and ``substitution'' effects cancel, so that the solutions are even simpler than 
those in section 3.1. 
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   ZXKX
LKKL
D
mm
w 

ˆ
1
ˆ
2








 . (24) 
 
where  LK DDD 2 , so that D2 does not have a definitive sign as in the general case.  This 
fact makes clear the possibility of a negative denominator in model comes from the substitution 
effect.  Yet, the solution for Ypˆ  in (22) is simple and always positive as the bracketed term in 
(14) collapses to one.   
The signs of rˆ  and wˆ  in (23) and (24) depend on the sign of the substitution effect 
 LKKL mm  , when noting that ZLZKLKKL mmmm   as shown in section 7.  This rewriting of 
the substitution effect helps clarify its interpretation.  Focusing on equation (23), if 
  0 LKKL mm  the 0ˆ r  and the return to capital rises (assuming a positive denominator).  If 
0KLm  and 0LKm  such that the inputs are Morishima substitutes in both directions, then 
  0 LKKL mm  implies that the capital-to-labor ratio increases more from a capital price 
decrease than the labor-to-capital ratio increases due to a labor price decrease (all else equal).  
That is, when capital is a better substitute for labor than labor is for capital, then the return to 
capital rises while the return to labor falls. 
 
4 Determining the Sign of D 
This section investigates the sign of D, as it is the only collection of parameters in the 
denominator of the general solutions that does not have a definitive, positive sign.  Recall, 
 LK BDADD   is a collection of production elasticities in sector Y (where 
 XKZKKZK mmD   and  XLZLLZL mmD  ).  In the general case, I assume that the 
denominator in equations (14)-(16) is positive, but D>0 is a sufficient condition to guarantee a 
positive denominator.   
 
4.A Analytical Conditions 
As shown above, when 0 Yjiij mm  , then the production function has a constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) and thus D>0.  This implies that if the production function has too irregular 
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a form, then D<0, which leads to the possibility that the denominator of the general solution is 
also negative.  However, requiring a CES production function is restrictive, so this section looks 
for other conditions that guarantee D>0. 
To begin, note the simple theorem: 
 
Theorem 9. If 0KD  and 0LD , then 0D . 
 
It follows from A>0 and B>0.  However, the next two theorems are more subtle and provide 
sufficient conditions to guarantee 0KD  and 0LD , respectively.  
 
Theorem 10. If 0LKm  and LZLK mm  , then 0KD . 
Theorem 11. If 0KLm  and KZKL mm  , then 0LD . 
 
For instance, assume capital and labor are better substitutes than capital and pollution 
 0 KZKL mm , then theorem 11 says 0LD .  That is, an increase in the capital rental rate 
reduces the capital-to-labor ratio more than it reduces the capital-to-pollution ratio.  That is, the 
clean inputs at better substitutes compared to the substitutability of capital and pollution.  This 
theorem also holds when 0KLm  and 0KZm , where the clean inputs are substitutes, but 
capital and pollution are complements.  A similar logic follows for theorem 10.  Taken together 
these theorems provide sufficient conditions to guarantee D>0 (via theorem 9) and thus eliminate 
the possibility of a negative denominator in the general solutions without the need to assume a 
CES production function. 
 
4.B Numerical Analysis 
Here, I check the sign of D using the parameter values in FH (2007), and I find D>0.  
Furthermore, this section shows that the Allen elasticity formulation of FH (2007) is numerically 
equivalent to the Morishima elasticity reformulation here, under an ``equivalent 
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parameterization'' where theorem 7 holds numerically and all other parameters are set to the 
same values.
13
  
To start the analysis, I collect share parameter values from FH (2007) and record them in 
table 23.  These parameters correspond to splitting the U.S. manufacturing sector into a ``clean'' 
sector (X) and a ``dirty'' sector (Y).  Sector X has a 60/40 cost split between labor and capital, so 
that  40.0XK  and 60.0XL .  Sector Y has the same labor to capital cost ratio as sector X, 
but pollution accounts for 25 percent of total cost; thus, 30.0YK , 45.0YK , and 25.0YZ .  
In addition, the ``clean'' sector constitutes 80 percent of the U.S. manufacturing sector so that 
80.0 LXKX   and conversely 80.0 LYKY  .  As a result of these assumption, 00.0 , 
25.0 LK  , and A=B=0.4875.  Additional values for the parameters defined in 3.2 include: 
40.0K , 30.1L , C=1.95.   
Next, table 24 contains calculations for corresponding Allen and Morishima elasticity 
values, and it yields three types of results.  First, columns [3] to [6] calculate the Morishima 
elasticities that correspond to the Allen elasticities in columns [1] and [2], given eKL=1 and the 
parameter values in table 24.  Specifically, rows 1 to 12 vary the elasticity values for eKZ and eLZ 
in same way as FH (2007).  I then use theorem 7 to calculate the Morishima elasticities that 
appear in the next four columns.  Here, as in FH (2007), I keep constant eKL and then vary the 
other Allen elasticities related to pollution.   
Reviewing the relationships between the different elasticities across and within the rows 
of table 24 yields some interesting observations.  First, when looking at pairs of Morishima 
elasticities, it is clear that in general they are not symmetric; that is, looking at columns [3] and 
[4] the values are generally different within a row.  Second, row 5 shows that a pair of 
Morishima elasticities can even have opposite signs, as mKZ>0 but mZK>0.  Third, the results in 
this table demonstrate theorems 4 and 5.  By theorem 4, positive values in column [1] for eKZ 
imply positive values in columns [3] for mKZ and [4] for mZK (and positive values in column [2] 
imply positive values in columns [5] and [6]).  By theorem 5, a negative value in column [1] for 
eKZ is a necessary condition for a negative value in either columns [3] and [4] (and similarly for 
                                                             
13 Applied theory papers at this point usually turn to the empirical literature to find reasonable estimates for model 
parameter to perform a numerical analysis.  Instead, this chapter performs the ``equivalent parameterization'' 
analysis to demonstrate a theoretical point. 
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column [2] in relation to columns [5] and [6]).  However, row 9 makes clear that negative Allen 
elasticities do not imply negative Morishima elasticities, since eKZ<0 but mKZ>0 and mZK>0.  
The second type of result in table 24 is the values of D when varying the Allen 
elasticities. Column [7] records the values of D that range from 0.3656 to 0.4875.  That is, for a 
wide range of parameter values, D>0 holds. 
Columns [8] to [10] provide the third type of result in table 24.  Under a 10 percent increase 
in the pollution tax, and assuming 1 YU  , these columns record changes in the price of 
good Y   Ypˆ , the capital rental rate  rˆ , and the wage rate  wˆ .  Again, all the assumptions and 
parameters that underlie these calculations are the same as in FH (2007), and so I have 
equivalently parameterized my model.  Therefore, by theorem 7, I expect the values here to be 
the same the values they calculate, and I find that to be true.  Thus, table 24 shows that regardless 
of whether Allen or Morishima elasticities measure trade-offs in production, equivalently 
parameterized models with the same primitives have the same numerical solutions.
14
  
 
5 Conclusion 
This chapter shows how to use Morishima elasticities of substitution in the formulation of an 
analytical general equilibrium model.  I find that interpreting the solutions using Morishima 
elasticities provides additional insight compared to using Allen elasticities, and thus the two 
methods are complementary.  These additional insights are: (1) enabling a direct comparison of 
magnitudes between the Morishima elasticities and the other elasticity parameters in the model; 
(2) finding economically meaningful conditions that guarantee a positive denominator; and (3) 
interpreting the substitution effect in terms of capital and labor elasticities.   Furthermore, I 
demonstrate the one-to-one numerical equivalence of models with the same primitives, 
regardless of whether a model uses Allen or Morishima elasticities. 
    
                                                             
14 The values in columns [8] to [10] differ slightly from those in table 2 of FH (2007) due to rounding in the 
intermediate steps, although they are identical to three decimal places. 
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6 Proofs 
Theorem 1.  To begin, recall  iijiijm   , and 0ii  [Chambers (1988)].  Thus, 0 ii , so 
0ji  implies 0ijm .  
 
Theorem 2.  Theorem 1 can be restated to say that 0ijm  implies 0ji .  Thus, 0ji  is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for 0ijm . 
 
Theorem 3.  Since 0ii  the proof proceeds with two cases.  First, if 0ji , then apply 
theorem 1.  Second, if 0 jiii  , then: 
 0 jiii   
 jijiii   0  
 0 jiii   
 0 ijm  
 0 ijm . 
 
Theorem 4-6.  Proofs for these three theorem follow directly from the proofs for theorem 1-3, 
respectively, when replacing ije  for ij  everywhere (since ije  and ij  have the same sign). 
 
Theorem 7. Since  iijiijm    and ijijjeS  , then: 
 iijiijm    
 iiijiiij eSeSm   
  iijiiij eeSm   
  iiijiij eeSm  . 
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Theorem 8.  Observe     YZLKBA   .  Thus,   0 BA  if and only if   0 LK   
(since 0YZ  always).  Thus, I need to show 0  if and only if   0 LK  , meaning 
  0 BA  always.  So:   
   0 XKYLXLYK   
 XKYLXLYK    
 
Xp
rK
Yp
wL
Xp
wL
Yp
rK
X
X
Y
Y
X
X
Y
Y   
 XYXY KLLK   
 
X
Y
X
Y
L
L
K
K
  
 LK    
   0 LK  . 
 
 
Theorem 10.  
 LZLK mm   
 0 LZLK mm  
 0 ZKKZ mm   (see section 7) 
 ZKKZ mm   
 XKZKKZ mm   
   0 XKZKKZ mm   
 0 KD .  
 
  
Theorem 11.  Follow the same steps as in theorem 10, but beginning with KZKL mm  . 
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7 Factor Response for Good Y 
The purpose of this section is to derive equations (12) and (13), which describe the input factor 
responses to changes in relative input prices in sector Y.  Define the conditional input demand 
functions from the costs minimization problem as follows:  
 
 YwrKK ZYY ,,,    
 YwrLL ZYY ,,,    
 YwrZZ Z ,,,  .  
 
where r is the price of capital, w is the price of labor, and Z  is the cost of pollution.  Constant 
returns to scale implies that the input demand functions are homogeneous of degree one in Y, and 
thus 1


Y
Y
K
Y
Y
K
, 1


Y
Y
L
Y
Y
L
, 1


Z
Y
Y
Z
.  So, totally differentiating and dividing through by 
the appropriate input level yields:  
 
YwrK ZKZKLKKY
ˆˆˆˆˆ     
YwrL ZLZLLLKY
ˆˆˆˆˆ     
YwrZ ZZZZLZK
ˆˆˆˆˆ   .  
 
where ij v is the constant-output, cross-price elasticity of demand for input i with respect to 
input price j.  The conditions for cost minimization imply that 0ii  and 0 iZiLiK   for 
all inputs i [Chambers (1988)].   
Here, following Mieszkowski (1972), researchers often introduce the Allen elasticities of 
substitution.  Instead, I start by subtracting the third equation from the first and second equations, 
respectively, to eliminate $\hat{Y}$, and I add and subtract appropriate terms to find:   
 
         ZZZKZLLZLLLKLZKKKY wrZK  ˆˆˆˆˆ    
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         ZZZLZZLLLKKZKKKLKY wrZL  ˆˆˆˆˆ    
 
Then, I apply the Morishima elasticity of substitution identity iijiijm   , to yield:  
 
  ZZKLZLKZKY mwmmrmZK ˆˆˆˆˆ    
  ZZLLZKZKLY mwmrmmZL ˆˆˆˆˆ    
 
Using the condition 0 iZiLiK   for all inputs i and the Morishima elasticity 
definition, I find that ZKKZLZLK mmmm   and ZLLZKZKL mmmm   (also 
ZLZKLKKL mmmm  ).  Finally, I can rewrite the above equations to get the final equations 
(12) and (13). 
 
References 
Allen, R. G. D. (1938): Mathematical Analysis for Economists. St. Martin's Press, New York, 
USA. 
 
Anderson, R. K., and J. R. Moroney (1993): “Morishima Elasticities of Substitution with Nested 
Production Functions," Economics Letters, 42(2-3), 159-66. 
 
Berndt, E. R., and D. O. Wood (1975): \Technology, Prices, and the Derived Demand for 
Energy," Review of Economics and Statistics, 57(3), 259-68. 
 
Blackorby, C., and R. R. Russell (1975): “The Partial Elasticity of Substitution," Discussion 
Paper No. 75-1, Economics, University of California, San Diego. 
 
Blackorby, C., and R. R. Russell (1989): “Will the Real Elasticity of Substitution Please Stand 
Up? (A Comparison of the Allen/Uzawa and Morishima Elasticities,” American Economic 
Review, 79(4), 882-8.  
 
Bovenberg, A. L., and R. A. De Mooij (1994): “Environmental Levies and Distortionary 
Taxation," American Economic Review, 84(4), 1085-89. 
 
Chambers, R. G. (1988): Applied production analysis: A dual approach. Cambridge, New 
York/Melbourne. 
 
Christev, A., and A. M. Featherstone (2009): “A Note on Allen-Uzawa Partial Elasticities of 
Substitution: The Case of the Translog Cost Function," Applied Economics Letters, 16(10-
122 
 
12), 1165-69. 
 
Considine, T. J., and D. F. Larson (2006): “The Environment as a Factor of Production," Journal 
of Environmental Economics and Management, 52(3), 645-62. 
 
Davis, G. C., and C. R. Shumway (1996): “To Tell the Truth about Interpreting the Morishima 
Elasticity of Substitution," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 44(2), 173-82. 
 
de Mooij, R. A., and A. L. Bovenberg (1998): “Environmental Taxes, International Capital 
Mobility and Inefficient Tax Systems: Tax Burden vs. Tax Shifting," International Tax and 
Public Finance, 5(1), 7-39. 
 
Fullerton, D., and G. Heutel (2007): “The General Equilibrium Incidence of Environmental 
Taxes," Journal of Public Economics, 91(3-4), 571-91. 
 
Fullerton, D., and H. Monti (2013): “Can Pollution Tax Rebates Protect Low-Wage Earners?," 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 66(3), 539-53. 
 
Harberger, A. C. (1962): “The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax," The Journal of 
Political Economy, 70(3), 215-40. 
 
Hicks, J. R. (1932): Theory of wages. Macmillan, London. 
 
Koetse, M. J., H. De Groot, and R. Florax (2008): “Capital-Energy Substitution and Shifts in 
Factor Demand: A Meta-analysis," Energy Economics, 30(5), 2236-51. 
 
Mieszkowski, P. (1967): “On the Theory of Tax Incidence," Journal of Political Economy, 
75(3), 250-62. 
 
Mieszkowski, P. (1972): “The Property Tax: An Excise Tax or a Profits Tax?,: The Journal of 
Public Economics, 1(1), 73-96. 
 
Morishima, M. (1967): “A Few Suggestions on the Theory of Elasticity (in Japanese)," Keizai 
Hyoron (Economic Review), 16(1), 144-50. 
 
Mundlak, Y. (1968): “Elasticities of Substitution and the Theory of Derived Demand.," Review 
of Economic Studies, 35(1), 225-36. 
 
Rapanos, V. (1986): “Variable Returns to Scale and Tax Incidence: An Extension of Harberger's 
Model.," Journal of Economics (Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie), 46(4), 397-406. 
 
Stern, D. I. (2011): “Elasticities of Substitution and Complementarity," Journal of Productivity 
Analysis, 36(1), 79-89. 
 
Uzawa, H. (1962): “Production Functions with Constant Elasticities of Substitution," Review of 
Economic Studies, 29, 291-99. 
123 
 
Tables and Figures 
Table 23: Parameter Values (with Equal Factor Intensities) 
 
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value 
XK  0.4000 KX  0.8000 K  0.4000 
XL  0.6000 LX  0.8000 L  1.3000 
YK  0.3000 KY  0.2000 A 0.4875 
YL  0.4500 LY  0.2000 B 0.4875 
YZ  0.2500 K  0.2500 C 1.9500 
  0.0000 L  0.2500 - - 
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Table 24: Calculations for Corresponding Allen and Morishima Elasticity Values (given 1KLe ) 
 
Row/Col KZe  [1] LZe  [2] KZm  [3] ZKm  [4] LZm  [5] ZLm  [6]  D [7] Ypˆ  [8] rˆ  [9] wˆ  [10] 
1 1.0 -0.5 1.0000 0.3250 -0.0500 -0.5000 0.4144 0.02500 0.00464 -0.00309 
2 0.0 0.0 0.4500 0.0000 0.3000 0.0000 0.3656 0.02500 0.00000 0.00000 
3 0.5 0.0 0.7250 0.2750 0.3000 0.1500 0.4022 0.02500 0.00155 -0.00104 
4 1.0 0.0 1.0000 0.5000 0.3000 0.3000 0.4388 0.02500 0.00306 -0.00204 
5 -0.5 0.5 0.1750 -0.5000 0.6500 0.2000 0.3534 0.02500 -0.00317 0.00212 
6 0.0 0.5 0.4500 0.2500 0.6500 0.3500 0.3900 0.02500 -0.00156 0.00104 
7 0.5 0.5 0.7250 0.5000 0.6500 0.5000 0.4263 0.02500 0.00000 0.00000 
8 1.0 0.5 1.0000 0.7750 0.6500 0.6500 0.4631 0.02500 0.00152 -0.00101 
9 -0.5 1.0 0.1750 0.1750 1.0000 0.5500 0.3778 0.02500 -0.00471 0.00314 
10 0.0 1.0 0.4500 0.4500 1.0000 0.7000 0.4144 0.02500 -0.00309 0.00206 
11 0.5 1.0 0.7250 0.7250 1.0000 0.8500 0.4509 0.02500 -0.00152 0.00102 
12 1.0 1.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4875 0.02500 0.00000 0.00000 
 
 
